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I. Introduction
In the decades leading to the First Opium War during the mid-
19th Century, imperial China, a prosperous, globally engaged
nation, found itself at or near the center of the economic universe.'
During that period, China amassed large trade surpluses and high
silver reserves through its active export economy, placing its
economy in a competitive and enviable market position.2 The
British Empire, at the time a preeminent global power, disfavored
China's economic policies and warned the Chinese government of
possible redress if it did not allow fairer trade practices., Britain's
threats went unheeded, and, as warned, the British flooded
Chinese markets with opium from colonial India despite heavy
restrictions placed on the drug by the Chinese government.' The
Chinese economy faltered as the population, glutted on opium,
spiraled into a "century of humiliation," as semi-colonial struggles
with foreign imperial nations dominated the once dynastic state.6
Fast-forward to the current global climate. China, now a
communist state7  attempting to modernize its economy, has
I See William A. Callahan, National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and
Chinese Nationalism, 29 ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOCAL, POLITICAL 199, 202
(2004).
2 See Arvind Subramanian, Chinese Mercantilism: The Long View, Bus.
STANDARD (Jan. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchlD= 1744.
3 Despite ceding imperial holdings in North America and Australia over the
preceding century, the British Empire during the 19th Century still maintained
impressive territorial possessions and influence throughout the world. See generally
JOHN HOLLAND ROSE, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE VOL. II, III
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1959).
4 See Subramanian, supra note 2.
5 See id.
6 See id. The persistent presence of colonial influences in many parts of China can
be cited as a historic occurrence that has impacted the nation's subsequent insistence on
self-reliance. See, e.g., infra note 64 and accompanying text.
7 The People's Republic of China [hereinafter PRC or China].
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developed an eerily similar export-driven economy supported by
policies designed to take advantage of the modem global system:
protectionist subsidies for domestic producers, discrimination
against foreign manufacturers, trading for Western technology,
and strictly measured currency devaluation, among others.
China's rise to economic prominence coincides with an
increasingly global economic environment, which has embraced
the Chinese entrepreneurial spirit for joint ventures and foreign
direct investment in Chinese projects.' These policies have
exacerbated China's relationship with another global power, the
United States. China's alleged currency manipulation has recently
served as a "flash point" between the two countries.o Presumably,
the international community would prevent retaliatory tactics by
the United States anywhere near those imposed by the British
Empire in the 19th Century." However, the United States
maintains several avenues of recourse against what many world
leaders and economists believe is intentional, unfair market
behavior harming both U.S. and international economic interests.12
Essentially, currency manipulation functions when "an
undervalued currency lowers a [manufacturing] firm's cost of
production relative to world prices and therefore helps to
encourage exports."" As applied in conjunction with other
government-run subsidy programs,' 4 currency devaluation has
8 See Steve Lohr, Maybe Japan Was Just a Warm-up for China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2011, at Bl.
9 This attractiveness to business investors is part of the dilemma for the United
States government. Many U.S.-based global companies have profited from Chinese
policies (and have, thus, been reticent to blow the whistle on the Chinese government)
while other, chiefly domestic U.S. companies have faltered as a result of Chinese
competition. See id
10 Gary Hufbauer & Jared Woollacott, Trade Disputes Between China and the
United States: Growing Pains So Far, Worse Ahead? 36 (PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L
EcoN., Working Paper No.10-17, Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp 10-1 7.pdf.
II See Subramanian, supra note 2.
12 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 35, 36.
13 JONATHAN SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22658, CURRENCY
MANIPULATION 2, 3 (2010).
14 See Terence Stewart, Accession of the People's Republic of China to the World
Trade Organization: Baseline of Commitments, Initial Implementation and Implications
for U.S.-PRC Trade Relations and US. Security Interests 4 (U.S.-China Econ. And Sec.
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propelled China's wild economic growth over the past decade.
China has paced the world economy as one of its leading exporters
on the strength of cheap goods relative to other global producers."
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
"WTO") in 200116 and its involvement in the Group of Twenty
(hereinafter "G-20")" is evidence of China's renewed relevance
and impact on the global economic and political stage. Indeed,
China has developed a "unique role" in the global economy due to
its posturing as the "factory of the world": providing cheap export
goods to other nations worldwide."
China's centrally controlled economic plan, however, comes
with both domestic and international consequences. 9  Many
economists doubt the sustainability of an economic system
perpetuated through a consistently devalued currency; a "weak-
currency policy" has encouraged increased investment
opportunities, which "overheat" the Chinese economy with foreign
dollars.20 Such growth has led to widespread inflation (and civil
unrest) across China.2' Indeed, the inflation China has
encountered recently has been cited as a natural, free market
reaction to government measures artificially devaluing the
22
currency. As one commentator put it, "China has stumbled into a
monetary muddle that's getting worse with each passing month."23
Unfortunately, the Chinese government has responded with
increasingly protectionist policies as opposed to those allowing the
currency to reset naturally. 24 These reactions are preferred, in part,
Review Comm'n, Research Paper Vol. 1, 2002).
15 See id. at 8-11.
16 See id. at 4.
17 See Sewell Chan, Obama Says China's Policy Is an 'Irritant' to Trading
Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, at A4.
18 Jiahua Pan et. al., China's Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade: Approaches
to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility, 24 OXFORD REV. OF ECON.
POL'Y 354, 368 (2008).
19 See Paul Krugman, China Goes to Nixon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at A27.
20 Id
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 Id
24 "Unfortunate" from the perspective of the U.S. and other world economies
hoping China would make good on promises to conform to international standards on
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to avoid widespread economic. malaise similar to that felt by Japan
during the 1990s. 25  Some see these measures as short-sighted,
perpetuating a system that is ultimately unworkable and which
may lead to more painful consequences than the government
hopes to avoid by applying these measures. 26 The Arab Spring has
caused some to draw parallels to the economic and social
conditions currently present in China.27
These seemingly unfair economic strategies have also
squeezed foreign economies as they attempt to climb out of the
depths of the recent global recession.28 These countries, in turn,
have sought recourse against China.2 9 Some, like Brazil, have
adopted similar currency control measures in an attempt to protect
their fragile economies.30 Others, like the United States, have
responded with somewhat alarming inconsistency: hawkish threats
of unilateral sanctions' followed by hopeful, yet firm, diplomatic
efforts aimed at cajoling the Chinese government into modifying
its policies.3 2  In total, calls for international sanctions have
increased in number and frequency; some see China's
"competitive devaluation" as a per se violation of China's
foreign exchange rates. See C. Fred Bergsten, Obama Has to Tell Beijing Some Hard
Truths, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/ (follow "2010" hyperlink; then select "Obama
Has to Tell Beijing Some Hard Truths" hyperlink).
25 See Gary Hufbauer, Patience and the Currency Wars, NAT'L INTEREST (Oct. 27,
2010), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/ (follow "2010" hyperlink;
then select "Patience and the Currency Wars" hyperlink).
26 See, e.g., David Lynch, China Will Face Crisis Within 5 Years, 45% ofInvestors
in Global Poll Say, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/china-will-face-crisis-within-5-years-45-
of-investors-in-global-poll-say.html.
27 See Francis Fukuyama, Is China Next?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2011, at Cl.
28 See David Sanger & Michael Wines, More Countries Adopt the Tactics of China
in Fight Over Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A4.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., James Bacchus, What a Trade War With China Would Look Like,
FORBES, Feb. 2, 2009 (discussing the then U.S. Treasury Secretary nominee Timothy
Geithner's comments during his confirmation hearings on the need for a tougher stance
on Chinese currency policy), available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/3 1/trade-wto-
china-opinions-contributors_0202james bacchus.html.
32 Cf Editorial, A Newly Cooperative China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at A20.
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international obligations.3 3 It is clear, though, that Chinese
currency policy has a net destabilizing effect on the world
economy. Estimating the impact of a revaluation of the renminbi,
William Cline, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics, found that, "[A fifteen] percent
revaluation of the [renminbi] . . . might reduce the US trade deficit
by $60 billion and take 500,000 American workers off the
unemployment payrolls."3 4 These staggering numbers show the
adverse effects Chinese currency manipulation can have in
depressing other world economies as well as the potential benefits
felt by those foreign economies with even modest Chinese reform.
Assessing these varied approaches to addressing China's
currency exchange policies uncovers the deficiencies in the current
international oversight systems. Unilateral sanctioning or
remedial actions proposed by individual nations cannot have a
meaningful impact on Chinese policies."5 If anything, unilateral
measures risk sparking "currency wars" that would have
deleterious effects on the global economy.3 6  Deference to
international governance organizations like the WTO and the IMF
for oversight runs into one crucial issue: as the international
governance system is currently structured, currency manipulation
as an intentional act does not fit neatly into a category of
prohibited acts subject to WTO jurisdiction.37 This highlights the
current disjunction between international governance bodies in
this area. Though the IMF recognizes currency manipulation as an
unfair advantage, the IMF cannot currently undertake enforcement
actions against manipulating countries." Conversely, the WTO is
an active sanctioning body, but currently does not recognize
33 Katherine Keenan, Fighting the "Currency Wars", THE PETERSON INST. FOR
INT'L ECON. (Nov. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/newsreleases/newsrelease.cfm?id= 166.
34 Hufbauer, supra note 25.
35 Cf Arvind Subramanian, America Cannot Win the Currency Wars Alone,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7fb95280-
dc8b- 1I df-a0b9-00144feabdc0.html.
36 William R. Cline & John Williamson, Currency Wars (PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L
ECON., Policy Brief no. PBl0-25, 2010), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pbl 0-26.pdf.
37 See SANFORD, supra note 13, at 2-3.
38 Id. at 4.
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currency manipulation as grounds for recourse. 39
This leaves countries with steady, consistent diplomacy as the
only current, and as this paper advocates, the most appropriate
means to coerce policy change in China. The use of international
fora, like the G-20, to stabilize the world economy is most
effective "by specifying rules of behavior that countries are
expected to follow that . .. reconcile the policies of different
nations . .. [and] persuading [nations] to alter their policies in
order to respect the interests of other countries."40 In sum,
"[m]ultilateralism could work because China would incur the
opprobrium of working against not just rich but poor countries,
and hence against the entire financial and trading system."41 With
many nations supporting policy change in China, it becomes easier
for the Chinese government to realize that policy change does not
have to be altruistic to China's exclusive detriment. Instead, it is
more likely that China would understand the global benefit from
its policy change as well as long-term Chinese growth.4 2
In the end, however, any remedial system designed to bring
China's currency into harmony with the global exchange market
will depend on China's acquiescence to such a process. The
Chinese government must concede that foreign nations and
international organizations have standing to impact Chinese
economic policies.43 One scholar recognizes that, "sensitivity [to
China's economic past] should lead to the use of carrots rather
than sticks to induce China's cooperation, and to an approach that
is energetically multilateral, aimed at designing better rules, rather
than aggressively unilateral, aimed at achieving particular
39 See id.
40 John Williamson, The Role of International Organizations in Creating a More
Stable Economy, Lecture delivered at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and
Research (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson2010ll30.pdf. Assuming changes
can be made in the WTO or IMF rules, these organizations could potentially supplement
hearty diplomacy on these issues.
41 Subramanian, supra note 35.
42 See Williamson Lecture, supra note 40, at 1.
43 See id. at 4-5. Such concessions may prove difficult to achieve if China's
adherence to nationalist policies continues into the administration of current vice-
president and named-successor to President Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping. See also Edward
Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, China Grooms a New Leader, Politically Deft, if Little
Known, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at Al.
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outcomes."44
Part II of this article progresses through the history of the
debate over China's currency policy including a brief sketch of
China's emergence as a developing nation into a global economic
power. Part II will also address several other grounds for dispute
emanating from China's economic policies. The development and
impact of international governance bodies, predominately the IMF
and WTO for the purposes of this paper, and their relative abilities
to address the currency manipulation issue are discussed in Part
III. Part IV sketches the disputes and sanctions between China
and the United States since China's accession to the WTO as well
as possible avenues of recourse the United States may take. This
comment concludes with a policy recommendation: the United
States should eschew unilateral sanctions in favor of steady, firm
diplomatic negotiations involving other global leaders in order to
coerce China in a timely yet peaceful manner to allow its currency
to appreciate to an equitable level.
II. Historical Analysis
This section develops the historical pretext to the current
issues revolving around China's currency policy. To understand
how this issue has evolved, it is necessary to discuss how the
Chinese government has evolved over time in both the economic
and political spheres. This section will first review the post-World
War II development of international organizations, specifically the
WTO and IMF, and their changing roles in the international
economic community. Next, this section will address China's
accession to the WTO and the obligations and expectations it
undertook in doing so. Finally, this section traces in some detail
the history of the currency policy issue itself as contextualized in
the current political administrations of both the United States and
China.
After analyzing these general developments, it becomes clear
that China, as a developing nation with issues and culture unique
to itself, has displayed a pattern of behavior inconsistent with its
promises and obligations to other nations. In seeking a place at
the table of world economic elites, China pledged to reform past
practices and usher in policies promoting fairness in the market
44 Subramanian, supra note 2.
[Vol. XXXVII254
CHINA CANNOT HAVE ITS CAKE AND EAT IT Too
place. Unfortunately, as will be seen, those obligations have gone
generally unheeded in favor of policies designed to take advantage
of China's place in the global market. In other words, China
wants to have its cake and eat it too.
A. The Post-WWII Landscape and the Proliferation of the
IMF and WTO
Towards the end of World War II, and the years following, the
international economic system was in disastrous shape. In order to
fill the void created by a devastated Europe and to plan funding for
rebuilding efforts after the war (while avoiding the pitfalls of the
Great Depression), leaders of various nations converged in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, for negotiations.4 5 At what would
become known as the Bretton Woods Conference, those leaders
carved out an international monetary system that pegged all
currency exchange rates unless circumstances were affecting
individual countries' currency equilibrium.4 6 This par value
system was to be monitored vigilantly by the IMF, with all
countries subsequently joining the IMF agreeing to operate on this
pegging system.4 7
As originally constituted, the IMF's role was to foster an
international system of fair and efficient world trade without
significant obstacles to trade being imposed by the various
member nations.4 8 Several of the purpose statements given in the
IMF's Articles of Agreement bear out this intention:
45 See Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944-71), INT'L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/extemal/aboutihistcoop.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
46 See id
47 See id. The other product of the Bretton Woods Conference, the World Bank,
had an equally vital role in providing funds for the rebuilding of the postwar and
continues to provide vital financing for emerging economies across the globe today. See
World Bank Group Historical Chronology: Introduction, THE WORLD BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/ (follow "About" hyperlink; then follow "history" hyperlink;
then follow "archives" hyperlink; then follow "chronology" hyperlink) (last visited Oct.
23, 2011). Perhaps this system of foreign aid, as observed by recent emerging
economies like China, was a driving factor in China adopting the export-driven
economic policies it currently has; from this perspective, driving up healthy reserves
from a vigorous export economy allows nations to invest directly into domestic projects
and endeavors without the need for foreign aid. See Williamson, supra note 40.
48 See SANFORD, supra note 13, at 1.
2011] 255
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through
a permanent institution which provides the machinery
for consultation and collaboration on international
monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of
the productive resources of all members as primary
objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly
exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid
competitive exchange depreciation.49
These statements emphasize the belief that free exchange of
goods and the success of a global economy depend on accurately
and fairly valued currencies. Initially, the IMF possessed the
authority to manage nations' exchange rates, but with the evolving
economy of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the par value system
was abandoned in favor of a floating system.so Without the need
to monitor tightly pegged exchange rates, member nations reduced
the role of the IMF from an enforcer to more of a watchdog
without any authoritative power to influence the actions of
member nations." Though amendments to the IMF agreements
contained provisions requiring countries to contemplate the effects
of their currency rates on other nations, those provisions have
proven toothless against nations which perceive currency
exchange rate as a sovereign decision.5 2
The Bretton Woods Conference also recognized the need to
49 Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Articles of Agreement, art. 1, if (i)-(iii) (emphasis
added).
50 See Williamson, supra note 40, at 3. Under the original IMF guidelines, a
country could not adjust its currency exchange rate without approval from the IMF. See
Cline, supra note 36, at 1. The only major restriction on this new system was the
prohibition against pegging currency to the value of gold. See Williamson, supra note
40, at 3. Under this new system, nations could freely "float" the values of their
currencies against those of other nations without IMF oversite. See Cline, supra note 36,
at 2.
51 See Williamson, supra note 40, at 3.
52 See Cline, supra note 36, at 2.
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establish an international organization to monitor trade amongst
nations, leading to the drafting of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter "GATT") and the pending creation
of the International Trade Organization (hereinafter "ITO") in
Havana, Cuba in 1947 and 1948." Though the ITO charter was
not approved by the U.S. Congress, overtime the GATT overcame
its lack of institutional framework to become a "de facto
international organization" successfully monitoring tariffs between
nations. The WTO as it is organized today was established in
1995 as a successor treaty organization evolving from the 1947
GATT treaty; the scope of the newly formed WTO incorporated
those provisions covered by the original 1947 GATT treaty, but
also included provisions and goals not contemplated by its
predecessor document. It was generally "intended to prevent
protection [from] being used to augment national demand.""
Each nation that accedes to the WTO agrees to each provision of
the original GATT treaty and all subsequent WTO rules, and
acknowledges the need to conduct trade in a responsible manner.s
As originally contemplated, the WTO demanded obligations of
each member nation designed to create a more harmonious trading
environment for all other member nations: limits on anti-dumping
duties by defining "dumping," and limits on countervailing duties
designed to offset subsidies on imported goods, among others.
Regarding "exchange arrangements," however, the WTO
explicitly ceded its authority to the IMF to resolve disputes and to
53 See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 79-80 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). Interestingly, China, then the
Republic of China, was an original signatory of the 1947 GATT but subsequently
withdrew from the treaty. See Hufbauer, supra note 10, at 4-5.
54 See VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 53, at 80-82.
55 See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154 (providing on overview of the agreements under which
the WTO member nations would operate).
56 Williamson, supra note 40, at 2.
57 See SANFORD, supra note 13, at 2.
58 See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness
Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law, NICOLAS INST. FOR
ENVTL. POL'Y SOLUTIONS 12-16 (Working Paper No. 07-02) (April 2007), available at
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/clirnate/policydesign/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-
competitiveness-concems-the-limits-and-options-of-intemational-trade-law (follow
"working paper" hyperlink).
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make determinations regarding the status of a member nation's
"exchange arrangements." 59 This shift is important. The WTO
obligations, as drafted, did not contemplate currency manipulation
as a sanctionable act.60 Therefore, the WTO as originally
conceived and operated depended on the IMF's oversight to
determine inappropriate action and to dole out punishment. After
the IMF was reduced to an advisory institution, GATT rules (as
adopted by the WTO) recognizing the IMF's oversight authority in
international economic issues were not amended to contemplate
this void.' Without an enforcement mechanism, current WTO
and IMF member nations have no legal means of recourse within
the international community against a party they believe is
manipulating its currency.
B. China's Economic Goals Shift Post-WWII
Amidst this ever-changing international landscape, the Chinese
government, in its various permutations since the end of World
War II, has focused on interjecting itself into the international
economy. Conflicts have been many, as political differences with
other countries and concerns over a Communist China's vast
resources have provoked a range of trade limitations and
diplomatic barriers to China's establishment as a relevant world
power. China's acceptance within the global community after
World War II has depended largely on outlasting Cold War fears
of communist uprisings that persisted in different forms into the
1980s.
The immediate post-World War II era saw the rise of the
People's Republic of China62 (hereinafter "PRC") and the rise of
59 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XV T 2, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt.
5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. A debate regarding the interpretation of this article exists which
becomes crucial to any attempt at soliciting the WTO for sanctions against China for
currency manipulation. See SANFORD, supra note 13, at 5. Essentially, the argument is
reduced down to whether the GATT Article XV term "exchange agreements" should be
interpreted in light of the meaning of the phrase when signed into being or interpreted
within the broader sense of the phrase as it has been understood more recently to include
foreign exchange rates (discussing the interpretation controversy). Id. For an action to
proceed against China as an Article XV violation, the latter, broader interpretation must
be adopted. See id
60 See Bachus, supra note 31.
61 See SANFORD, supra note 13, at 3.
62 The Chinese Civil War was a drawn out affair, interrupted by several other wars,
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reactionary trade embargos against Chinese exporters by NATO
member nations, Australia, and Japan which were designed to
limit the international reach of China.63 Chinese economic policy
under Chairman Mao played into these Western concerns, as it
was a direct rejection of capitalist programs (at least as it was
envisioned): Mao and his advisors strove for self-sufficiency
through economic isolation.64 Not until Mao's most extreme
advisors passed on, and more noticeably, not until Mao's death in
1976 was there a mutually renewed interest in trade and economic
development between capitalist societies and China. 65  U.S.
President Richard Nixon's visit to China remains the iconic
moment precipitating this d6tente, but other indications of China's
reemergence on the global stage were apparent in the later years of
Mao's reign.66
Gary Hufbauer, a respected international trade scholar, has
summarized several highpoints of China's attempts to reinvigorate
its economy during the 1970s and 1980s:
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping [successor to Mao Zedong] assumed
leadership of a massive and remarkably successful economic
transformation, leading to a market-oriented and capitalist-
flavored PRC economy. China and the United States signed a
trade relations agreement the following year, according each
other most favored nation status. The Deng leadership ushered
in a period of PRC rapprochement with the international
economic community. In 1980, China occupied the erstwhile
Taiwanese seat within the IMF and the World Bank, and
requested observer status within the GATT (granted in 1982).
In 1983, China signed the Multi-Fiber Agreement [establishing
quotas of textile exports in developing countries] and in 1986 it
asked to rejoin the GATT, starting a 15 year long process toward
but ultimately resulted in the division between the PRC and the Republic of China
(Taiwan). See GRAHAM HUTCHINS, INTRODUCTION to MODERN CHINA: A GUIDE TO A
CENTURY OF CHANGE 7-8 (2001).
63 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 5.
64 See HUTCHINS, supra note 62, at I 1-12.
65 See id at 12.
66 See id at 12 (noting that impact of Mao's policies were not felt until he died in
September of 1976).
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WTO accession.6 7
The 1980s was, indeed, a decade during which the Chinese
government recognized the importance of foreign capital and
intellectual investment for the PRC to become an economically
and politically relevant country.68 Despite the gradual embrace of
a "free" market economy, the Chinese government has maintained
that such progress would be on its terms and its time table,69
creating the appearance to some that the Chinese government is
concerned with its own industrial and economic growth.70 China
would have to lobby hard to dispel persistent worries about its
controlled-market economy and government initiatives to gain
greater access to the global economic system.
C. China's WTO Accession and Obligations
The fact that China's accession to the WTO took fifteen years
is indication enough that other WTO member nations wanted to
ensure that China's commitment to economic fairness and the
rule-based trade system was, in fact, a sincere one.71 Political
unrest in China following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989
and the Chinese government's reaction to the East Asian financial
crisis of 1997 and 1998 provided ample fodder for political
opponents to China's accession.72
The prolonged accession period was also indicative of the
concerns the member nations had with the status of China's pre-
accession economic system.73  To promote domestic economic
67 Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 5.
68 See id. (noting that Deng Xiaoping's policy and the signing of a trade agreement
with the United States indicates a recognition of the importance of trade and investment
by China).
69 Cf Lohr, supra note 8, at BU6 (noting the government controlled "special
economic zones" and technology-for-trade incentives for foreign firms in China).
70 See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 19, at A27 (discussing China's measures
responding to rapid commodities inflation).
71 See Yu Min-you, China's Compliance with its WTO Commitments: An Analysis
by Compliance Theory, in CHINESE LAW SERIES: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND
CHINA IN ITS ECONOMIC TRANSITION, 101, 117-18 (Huiping Chen, ed., 2007).
72 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 6; see also Min-you, supra note
71, at 118 (describing the politicization of China's WTO accession process as a result of
human rights and international security considerations).
73 See generally Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 107, 108 (discussing steps China
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growth during this period, the Chinese government instituted
measures seen by the western world as overly protective: "strict
quotas, high tariffs, poor intellectual property rights, restrictions
on foreign investment, and other forms of market intervention." 7 4
Nevertheless, bilateral negotiations between China and many key
members of the WTO provided the needed support for Chinese
accession, and China formally acceded to the WTO on December
11, 2001. China's accession to the WTO was billed as a
"balanced and ambitious package of market opening
commitments, which [were meant to] bring substantial benefits to
China as well as to their WTO trading partners."7 6 China's
Accession Agreement manifested the cautions held by WTO
member nations by establishing benchmarks and obligations
designed to transition China from its controlled-economy to a
more free market economy. The agreement provided general
commitments from China on a variety of trade platforms:
a. China will provide non-discriminatory treatment to all
WTO Members. All foreign individuals and enterprises,
including those not invested into or registered in China,
will be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to enterprises in China with respect to the right
to trade.
b. China will eliminate dual pricing practices as well as
differences in treatment accorded to goods produced for
sale in China in comparison to those produced for
export.
c. Price controls will not be used for purposes of affording
must take in order to become a WTO member and assessments that must be made by the
WTO to ensure that China is making reforms consistent with WTO mandates).
74 Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 5, 6. One staggering fact relevant to
China's historic tendency to manipulate its currency is that on January 1, 1994, the
Chinese government unilaterally devalued its currency by fifty percent: distinct evidence
of China's reticence to embrace the free market economy. See Letter from Paul T. Jones
II, Founder, Tudor Inv. Grp., to Investors 2 (Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with author).
75 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 6.
76 See Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 109 n.21 (quoting Press Release, European
Commission, IP/01/1289 (Sept. 19, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/0 I /
1289&format-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).
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protection to domestic industries or service providers.
d. China will implement the WTO Agreement in an
effective and uniform manner by revising its current
domestic laws and enacting new legislation in full
compliance with the WTO agreement.
e. Within three years of China's accession, all enterprises
will have the right to import and export all goods and
trade them throughout the customs territory with limited
exceptions.
f. China will not maintain or introduce any export
subsidies on agricultural products.7
This summary of directives provides evidence of the areas of
concern the member nations had in agreeing to China's accession.
Of note, interested member nations identified China's price
control measures as a protectionist tactic that would generally not
be tolerated upon China's accession." The specific terms of the
agreement spelled out the prohibition against market
manipulation: "China shall. . . allow prices for traded goods and
services in every sector to be determined by market forces."
Though this is not a per se restriction on currency manipulation,
this prohibition, when read with additional language in the
Working Party Report on China's Accession regarding non-
discriminatory treatment of foreign producers, provides ample
evidence that any market tactic designed to favor Chinese
domestic producers over foreign firms would not be acceptable.so
The Working Party Report, which is incorporated by reference
into China's Accession Agreement, provides further evidence that
price manipulation was explicitly discussed in the context of
China's accession: Chinese representatives committed to
"implement [China's] obligations with respect to [foreign
exchange] matters in accordance with the provisions of the WTO
Agreement and related declarations and decisions of the WTO that
77 Id. at 103-04 (emphasis added).
78 See Accession of the People's Republic of China, pt.I § 9, 15, WT/L/432 (Nov.
23, 2001) [hereinafter Chinese Accession Agreement].
79 Id. at pt. I § 9.
80 See, e.g., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 1 19, 22,
WT/MIN(01)/3 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Working Party Report] (describing, in
general, China's non-discrimination commitments).
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concerned the IMF."" Such manipulation would destroy the free
and presumably equal trade status between member nations by
giving domestic production firms an undue advantage over foreign
producers in the same markets. As can be seen in the status of the
conflict between the United States and China today, that provision
has gone mostly unenforced and, until recently, has provoked few
complaints from member nations.82
China's Accession Agreement also provided deadlines for
achieving certain trade-oriented benchmarks designed to reduce
tariff amounts and increase accessibility to Chinese domestic
markets for foreign producers." It also contained provisions
allowing other member nations to take discriminatory actions
against Chinese exporters to protect their economies from alleged
Chinese product dumping and subsidizing.84
Though China appeared to meet many market targets easily
within the mandated deadlines, there were evident difficulties in
implementing macro-level legal reforms throughout various
Chinese provinces." As a result, it was clear there were tensions
with trade partners regarding pledged reforms within the first
several years after China's accession.8 6 China failed to meet many
of its self-imposed deadlines for reducing tariffs in certain
industries and continued to struggle in implementing reforms in
information technology, export subsidies, and other economic
sectors.8 ' Five years after accession, the United States Trade
Representative (hereinafter "USTR"), the administrative office
tasked with assessing China's compliance with its WTO
obligations as they relate to U.S. interests, found China to be
81 Id. T 35.
82 The ambivalence to China's protectionist policies by some is the product of a
business culture that recognizes the potential returns on investments in China and that
culture's reticence to upset these returns. See Lohr, supra note 8, at Bl.
83 See Min-you, supra note 71, at I10.
84 See id. at 111. These somewhat one-sided accession terms were a bitter pill to
swallow for some analysts from the Chinese perspective. See id at 108-11.
85 Cf id. at 85 (citing "areas of omission, conflict, and vagueness" of Chinese
reforms which could not be reconciled with China's pledges under its Accession
Agreement).
86 See id. at 133.
87 See id. at 133-34.
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deficient in several key areas of compliance." In an annual report,
the USTR isolated systemic problems that persisted in the Chinese
economic system:
China's implementation work is still incomplete. . . . Many of
the shortfalls in China's WTO compliance efforts seem to stem
from China's incomplete transition from being a state-planned
economy.... China has not yet fully embraced the key WTO
principles of market access, non-discrimination and national
treatment, nor has China fully institutionalized market
mechanisms and made its trade regime predictable and
transparent.89
These persistent shortcomings combined with the increased
market activity between the United States and China have became
grounds for dispute between the two nations.90
Chinese Accession Agreement provisions outlined the
relatively stringent obligations conditioning China's accession.
They also gave rise to criticisms and forecasts as to whether China
had the capacity or desire to adhere to its obligations under the
WTO.92 Leaders recognized the immense challenge facing the
Chinese government to transform a centrally-controlled economy
into an essentially free-market economy in complete compliance
with WTO provisions. 93 Scholars also recognized the importance
of China's acceptance within the global trading system as a
progressive nation.94 However, those same scholars were keenly
aware that many Chinese officials and businessmen did not truly
grasp the impact and implications of WTO accession on everyday
business practices and the increased foreign competition
88 See Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 134.
89 Id. (quoting USTR, 2005 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance
(Dec. i1, 2005)).
90 See id.
91 See id. at 103-04.
92 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 16, at 84-85. Compliance can be distilled down to
recognition by both a country's government and citizens that compliance is beneficial
and their actions manifesting that recognition. See Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 111-
29.
93 See Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 112.
94 See id. at 112-13.
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nationwide that would result.9 5 For one, the Chinese government
could not sacrifice dips in production and economic growth for the
sake of fostering foreign competition because its economy was,
and is, oriented to maximize trade surpluses.96 But it appears that
China knew its massive growth potential coupled with its WTO
accession created an economic atmosphere irresistible to foreign
investors and global manufacturers looking to capitalize on the
opportunity. However, China's historically pragmatic approach to
rules and regulations is inconsistent with the expectations of trade
partners. 97 This somewhat consistent policy of "subordination of
law to political considerations" creates many of the ongoing
tensions between China and its trading partners.9 8 As Long
Yongtu, China's Foreign Minister of Trade, indicated leading to
China's accession:
We [, China,] are used to dodging rules, or adopting an attitude
of pragmatism toward rules, thus causing chaos in the market
economic order. . . . In many cases, it is hard to get rid of old
habits, often it is impossible to solve the problem by relying on
one's own strength alone, a sound, effective extemal force can
impel us to accomplish something which we want to do but have
delayed to accomplish. 99
95 See id. at 113-14.
96 Cf David Barboza, Currency Fight With China Pits US. Businesses Against
Each Other, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at BI (explaining current reticence to reform
currency policy). Some of the impetus for maximizing trade surpluses is to limit
dependence on foreign or international sources for investment capital. See supra Part
II.B (discussing the development of China's export economy in Post WWII era).
Similarly, this drive for self-sufficiency has evidenced itself in China's current famine
threat due to severe drought conditions in Chinese agricultural regions. See Keith
Bradsher, U.N. Food Agency Issues Warning on China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A8.
Because China has amassed such a large trade surplus, it can enter the world grain
market without relying on heavy borrowing to purchase grain needed to cover losses
from its own fields. See id What is good for China may not be good for the rest of the
grain importing world: unexpected Chinese competition for grain will drive prices higher
than usual, as China can effectively outbid most other nations depending on grain
imports. See id
97 Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 125-27.
98 See id. at 125.
99 Id. at 125-26 n.59 (quoting Interview with Long Yongtu, Chief Negotiator from
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation (Nov. 8, 2001)).
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As will be seen, this persistent pragmatic attitude provides a
constant source for conflict between China and its trade partners.
Inevitably, as trade volumes and political consequences increase,
so do the number and severity of claims against China.'00
D. China's Currency Manipulation as a Political Hot Topic
Long before President Barak Obama took office in January
2009, China artificially devalued its currency, the renminbi.'o'
However, U.S. leaders were reluctant to publically raise it as an
issue prior to the current administration.' 02 Early on, the Obama
administration emphasized its willingness to press the Chinese
government on currency manipulation as an important issue that
needed resolution.'0 3 The administration's position amounted to
little more than posturing, as Obama and staff members were
confronted with more pressing issues during their first one
hundred days.' 04 Criticisms by Obama and other G-20 leaders in
the months prior to the G-20 summit in late June 2010 netted an
announcement from the government-controlled central bank of
China that the renminbi would be allowed to appreciate relative to
other world currencies.'0 o Despite this announced currency
reform, studies examining economic statistics taken nearly half a
100 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 3 (recognizing the frequency of
conflict between the United States and China increased as the amount of trade between
the two increased following China's WTO accession).
101 See Jones II, supra note 74 (stating how China, on January 1, 1994, unilaterally
devalued its currency by fifty percent).
102 Cf, SANFORD, supra note 13, at 4 (describing the conciliatory stance the George
W. Bush Administration took on the currency manipulation issue as compared to the
Obama Administration's attempted aggressive stance).
103 See Bacchus, supra note 31 (noting statements made by President Obama while
campaigning). It should be noted that though Mr. Gaethner has pressed a hard-line
stance on this currency issue, he also has stated that he recognizes the difficult
predicament the Chinese government is in to meet the interests of its people. See Sanger
& Wines, supra note 28, at A4.
104 See generally Joe Klein, Joe Klein on the President's Impressive Performance
Thus Far, TIME MAG. (Apr. 23, 2011), available at http://www.time.com/ (search "Joe
Klein on The President's Impressive Performance Thus Far") (addressing many of the
vital issues President Obama faced during his first 100 days in office).
105 See Judy Chen, et al., China Signals End to Yuan's Peg to Dollar Before G-20
Summit, Citing Economic Recovery, Bus. WK. (June 20, 2010, 4:38 A.M.), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-20/china-signals-end-to-yuan-s-peg-to-
dollar-before-g-20-summit.html.
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year later showed the renminbi had actually continued to
devalue.10 6  Perhaps as a response to this startling pattern, the
Obama administration and Congress resolved to take a harder
stance on Chinese currency policy (and other trade issues) by
threatening WTO involvement if China refused to allow its
currency to appreciate. 07
Around this period, legislators in each house of Congress
separately proposed legislation that would give the administration
the necessary means to label China as a currency manipulator and
to pursue remedial efforts in the instance China would not
voluntarily allow the renminbi to appreciate.' The proposed
Senate bill would provide the Commerce Department with an
affirmative duty to seek active countermeasures against foreign
nations found by the Treasury Department to be unfairly
manipulating their currencies.o' The House of Representatives
version did not mandate action but instead opted to give the
Commerce Department the discretion to pursue countervailing
106 See Keenan, supra note 33, at 1-2.
107 See Sewell Chan, U.S. Signals Impatience with China, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 16,
2010, at B1. Around this time, the United Steelworkers union filed a petition with the
United States Trade Representative to examine possible improper subsidies provided to
Chinese clean energy product manufacturing firms. See United Steelworkers Union,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE § 301 PETITIoN (2010).
This petition alleging violations of specific WTO obligations by the Chinese government
is indicative of the politically-charged nature of this economic debate, especially during
the election-cycle. Chinese government officials saw it as such. See Michael Wines &
Xiyun Yang, China Escalates Fight With U.S. on Energy Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2010, at Bl.
108 See, e.g., H.R. 2378, 11th Cong. [hereinafter Fair Trade Act] (as passed by
H.R., Sept. 29, 2010). The House of Representatives bill passed easily; however, the bill
proposed in the Senate during the 11Ith Congress never made it to the floor for debate.
See S. 3134, 111th Cong. (2010). A consistent version of the bill has been reintroduced
in the 112th Congress. See Daniel Malloy, Sanctions Pushed for Managed Chinese
Currency, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETrE (Jan. 18, 2011), avaialble at http://www.post-
gazette.coml/pg/ll 018/l1l8780-84.stm. The bill passed by a sixty-three to thirty-five
majority in early October. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Jabs China Over Its Currency,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), at Bl. Somewhat confusingly, the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives is not expected to bring the bill to a vote. See id. This conflict
seems to add credence to the White House concerns of too severe sanctions against
China and the consequences for a recovery economy. See id.
109 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 30-31 (discussing the Senate bill
as composed during the 11 Ith Congress).
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duties'' against a foreign nation found to be unfairly manipulating
its currency."' Some have hoped that "perhaps the bill passed by
the House ... will serve as the warning shot that prompts Beijing
to allow the renminbi to appreciate.""12 Those hopes have yet to
be realized.
The U.S. government has also taken domestic economic
measures calculated to stimulate its economy. These steps include
massive financial stimulus packages replete with "Buy American"
protectionist provisions"l3 as well as rounds of "quantitative
easing" designed to induce greater liquidity in the U.S. lending
market.1 4 These steps have not endeared the United States to the
remainder of the global economic community."'
These actions (or inactions) taken by the United States and
China did not occur in a bubble. The remainder of the world has
not remained idle as this trade dispute has smoldered; rather, quite
the opposite has occurred.116 Other nations reacted, in part, to the
increasingly protectionist policies of the two trade giants and, in
part, to the dire economic outlook facing the global economy." 7
These nations reacted by enacting protectionist policies of their
own and attempted to engage the United States and China in trade
issues that could affect the global market."8 Many of these
negotiations have emanated from G-20 summits, most recently in
Toronto and Seoul.' 19
110 See discussion infra Part III.A.
I See Fair Trade Act, supra note 108, § 2(c).
112 Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 36.
113 See id. at 26-27. The protectionist provisions of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) conditioned direct government investment for
projects on use of U.S.-based products and manpower. See id. at 27-28.
114 Quantitative easing is an economic measure designed to stimulate a nation's
economy wherein that nation's central bank buys back government bonds from banks
and other commercial entities to increase cash flow and increase lending. See Larry
Elliot, Quantitative Easing, Term in Business Glossary, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2009),
avaialbe at http://www.guardian.co.ukibusiness/ 2008/oct/14/businessglossary.
115 See Liz Alderman, Bernake Warns G-20 on Money Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2011, at BI (mentioning unfavorable views of U.S. currency policy held by developing
nations).
116 See id.
117 See Sanger & Wins, supra note 28, at A4.
118 See id.
119 See id.
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In the months leading to the G-20 summit in Seoul, South
Korea in November 2010, the international community appeared
more concerned with protecting each respective nation's economy
than with global economic harmonization. Countries with fragile
export economies like Japan and Brazil took measures similar to
China's to control their own currencies. 120 These countries hoped
to devalue their currencies specifically against the renminbi, an
indication that they had little faith in Chinese promises to allow
the renminbi to appreciate in value. 121 Not to be seen as choosing
sides, many countries expressed their displeasure at the U.S.
Federal Reserve System's decision to undergo several rounds of
quantitative easing due to the depreciating effects it would have on
the U.S. dollar.122 Though the long-term effects of these measures
were designed to stimulate the global economy, the short-term
devaluation of the U.S. dollar would harm many countries' export-
based economies.123  Quantitative easing was such a hot-button
topic that it shifted what the Obama administration had hoped to
be a unified front opposing Chinese currency manipulation to a
more fractured discussion on trade rights in general.12 4  When
world leaders met in Seoul, the large majority of the summit was
spent arguing over philosophical differences in trade stimulus.'25
The discussion centered primarily on U.S. quantitative easing, not
120 See id.
121 See id. These concerns remained despite diplomatic visits by Chinese officials
to many European countries in the hopes of persuading European leaders to further open
their nations to Chinese investment. See Liz Alderman, China Looks to Europe for
Deals and Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at A4. On these visits, Chinese leaders
reminded the Europeans that China was willing to purchase European debt during the
international economic crisis. See id. These overtures were not only meant to solicit
further economic ties, but also to carry favor regarding currency policy. See id
122 See Interview by Jeremy Hobson with Julia Coronado, Economist at BNP
Paribas (Nov. 8, 2010).
123 See id.
124 See Sewell Chan et al., Obama's Economic View is Rejected on World Stage,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2010, at Al. As one commentator notes, these worries were short-
sighted compared to the concerns over China's currency manipulation. See The Fed v.
the G-20, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at A34. China's currency manipulation is
designed as a long-term economic policy to meet foreign demand for Chinese exports;
however, U.S. quantitative easing is meant to thaw credit lending domestically to
stimulate the economy in the short-term. See id.
125 See Chan, supra note 124, at Al.
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Chinese currency devaluation. 126
Given the posture of the parties going into it, the results of the
Seoul G-20 summit were to be expected: preliminary agreements
were made to monitor and avoid large trade deficits and surpluses
which could harm the global economy, but no nation was
committed to implementing these concessions by assigning an
oversight capacity to any global organization.127  The nations
deferred to future negotiations whenever any "big, enduring
imbalances" were identified.'2 8 The Seoul Communiqu6 lacked
any particular language to implement any of its vague promises to
"strengthen multilateral cooperation" and avoid "protectionist
trade actions in all forms." 29 This lack of firm commitment on
currency manipulation left President Obama to stew, venting to the
press about China's extensive market control tactics and export-
based economy.' Although, by most accounts, there were minor
agreements made in Seoul regarding the international economic
system, the "G-20 stalemate ... intensified the feud over
currencies and trade rather than help . . . to resolve it."' 3'
Obama's concerns were not allayed when the Chinese
government announced stricter monetary policies to combat rising
commodities inflation during the winter of 2010-1 1.132 These
attempts to avoid an overheated economy restricted foreign
investment and instituted price controls to monitor the money
supply more closely.'3 3 These tightened monetary measures were
also attempts to reign in bank loans, which partially drove the
overheating of China's economy. 3 4  To some economists, the
126 See id.
127 See Chan, supra note 17, at A4. There was recognition of the need to provide
the IMF with greater control over international monetary issues but no concrete
indication of what that increased power that would be. See The G-20 Seoul Summit
Leaders' Declaration, 1 9 (Nov. 11-12, 2010).
128 See The G-20 Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration, T 9 (Nov. 11-12, 2010).
129 Id. TT 7, 9.
130 See, e.g., Chan, supra note 17, at A4 (summarizing President Obama's take-
away thoughts on the summit).
131 Bergsten, supra note 24.
132 See Keith Bradsher, China's Focus on Food Cost May Ignore Inflation Risk, NY
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at Bl.
133 See id. at B l, B4.
134 See Keith Bradsher, China is Poised to Raise Rates Again, Bankers Say, N.Y.
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inflation was an inevitable consequence of the surging money
supply built on state-owned lending and an export-driven
economy.'"' This was precisely how the Obama administration
did not want the Chinese government to respond to inflation:
treating the symptom, which is inflation, rather than the illness of
an artificially devalued currency."' China's reactions to inflation
and an overheated economy were aimed at incubating and
sustaining domestic economic growth at the expense of foreign
economies: little change could be seen in the Chinese policy of
maintaining astronomical trade surpluses and an artificially
devalued currency.' Without foreign pressure, the Chinese
government would continue to act without regard for foreign
economies. 1'
Notwithstanding Obama's harsh words, the tension in the
international community, and China's tightened monetary policy,
market conditions in China may have finally convinced the
Chinese government to engage in meaningful discussions with the
U.S. Some commentators saw the self-correcting market forces as
a vehicle for d6tente between the United States and China. '
Indeed, as inflation continued to worsen through January 2011,
Chinese president Hu Jintao's diplomatic visit to Washington,
D.C. seemed an attempt at conciliation with the United States.140
Amidst the ceremonial pomp of state dinners and lavish
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at Bl.
135 See Bradsher, supra note 132; see also Krugman, supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
136 See id.
137 See Bergsten, supra note 24. Though the renminbi has been recently
appreciating against the dollar, the Chinese government still maintains measures to
control the appreciation rate. See Bradsher, supra note 132.
138 See Bergsten, supra note 24.
139 Inflation in commodities prices was attributed to the marked slow-down in
exports from China to other global trade partners. See Keith Bradsher, Inflation in China
May Limit U.S. Trade Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, at BI. These trade partners,
including the U.S., refused (at least for the time being) to contract at a higher price with
Chinese exporters for the inflation-effected goods. See id For the U.S., such refusals
meant a lowering of the trade deficit with China, another contentious aspect of trade
relations between China and the U.S. See id.
140 See Helene Cooper & Mark Landler, Obama Raises Human Rights, Pressing
China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at Al.
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entertainment,141 President Obama and President Hu were able to
discuss a wide variety of topics that have generally caused conflict
between the two countries: human rights issues, intellectual
property rights, North Korea, and China's currency policy.14 2
Though no agreements were reached, the dialogue was important:
Hu's promises to reign in intellectual property theft and China's
"indigenous innovation" directives,143  along with his
acknowledgment of the currency discrepancy, displayed a
previously unlikely willingness to discuss these issues with foreign
leaders. 144
The inflationary issues China has faced recently in its domestic
market may have sparked this progress; it also could have been
motivated in part by the Chinese government's desire to see the
renminbi elevated to the status of a world reserve currency along
with the U.S. dollar and Japanese Yuan.145 To do so, the Chinese
government will have to show the world that its continued growth
is sustainable and demonstrate a willingness to institute gradual
reform to its economic and political system to support a more
stable economic system.146 These assurances could only be made
if China can slowly shift away from its export-driven economy
bolstered by U.S. debt holdings.147
Further d6tente could be found following the G-20 meeting
held in Paris in the Spring of 2011 to discuss, among other things,
developing internationally recognized measures for economic
distress.' 8 China, after providing initial resistance, cooperated
141 The state leaders and invited guests, including Jackie Chan and Barbara
Streisand, among other notable dignitaries, enjoyed a dinner of fresh Maine lobster and
dry-aged rib-eye steaks as well as various entertainment from various artists including
Chinese pianist Lang Lang and American Herbie Hancock. See Katherine Skiba, Hu
Treated to American Feast, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at AA2.
142 See Cooper & Landler, supra note 140.
143 China's "indigenous innovation" policy has pushed foreign direct investment in
technology, thereby reducing the reliance on foreign technology and decreasing the
export potential from other countries. See Lohr, supra note 8.
144 See Cooper & Landler, supra note 140.
145 See David Barboza, In China, Tentative Steps to Making the Renminbi a Global
Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at BI.
146 See id. A more stable economic system will lead to greater influence over
foreign financial markets and cheaper debt financing for China. See id.
147 See id
148 See Liz Alderman, As G20 Leaders Set Deal, Geithner Criticizes China, N.Y.
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with other G-20 members in drafting an agreement that could be
used to determine when or if a country's actions have caused
global economic imbalances.'4 9 China was persuaded by other G-
20 delegations to include exchange rate and currency policies as
factors to be included in any such future analysis."' Global
leaders saw this tentative agreement as a solid step towards
developing international accountability within the currency
exchange system.'"' These agreements also provide further proof
of China's gradual acceptance of foreign influence in its
policies.'52
These concessions may be considered cautiously optimistic
that the Chinese government has realized that a long-term
diplomatic and business relationship with another world power
requires open dialogue on various issues that may not necessarily
provide short-term benefits. China may have also realized that it
may not be able to play by its own rules in a growing global
economy. This optimism should be tempered until the Chinese
government actually implements its promised reforms,'
something the U.S. Congress is loathing to wait.15 4
III. Avenues for Recourse in the Existing Conflict
As the conflict between the United States and China smolders
between the leaders and dignitaries of the two nations, the recently
proposed legislation by both houses of Congress indicate the
degree of seriousness with which U.S. politicians are addressing
the issue. 155 These actions show the general consensus shared by
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2011, at A10.
149 See id
Iso See id
151 See id
152 See id
153 Some, including U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke have little faith in
China's promised governmental reforms, citing its historic track record of hollow
promises. See Dustin Ensinger, Locke Chides China on Indigenous Innovation,
ECONOMY IN CRISIS: AMERICA'S ECONOMIC REPORT, (Feb. 3, 2011), avaialble at
http://economyincrisis.org/content/locke-chides-china-indigenous-innovation.
154 Cf Hutbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 30-32 (predicting the eagerness of
the U.S. Congress to unilaterally sanction China over Chinese currency policy without
waiting for a declaration by the IMF on the issue and despite the near certainty that
China would seek redress from the WTO).
155 See supra text accompanying notes 108-112 (discussing the House and Senate
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U.S. politicians and many economists: China actively manipulates
its currency to such a degree that it adversely affects global
competition in a variety of markets in statistically significant
ways.'56  The logical question, and the issue that this paper
confronts, is what can and should the United States do about it.
There are a number of tactics the United States could
implement in dealing with China's purportedly unfair currency
manipulation.' 7 The United States could act unilaterally, relying
on self-determined sanctions and remedial measures against
China. It could seek dispute resolution and sanctions through
international organizations like the WTO and IMF, or it could
utilize multilateral diplomacy channeled through the G-20 or
another diplomatic forum. Each of these approaches has its
strengths and weaknesses, as well as historic antecedents that may
forecast the likelihood of a Chinese response. Whatever policy the
United States adopts, U.S. trade representatives and policymakers
must contemplate the impact. These actions have an effect not
only on the Chinese and U.S. economies and its political
relationships, but also on global economic and political systems.
This section addresses each of these approaches to solving the
policy dispute with China over its currency devaluation. While
historical accounts of each method are not necessarily indicative
of how China will respond to these pressures, they do give
evidence of past precedent that is of some value. With these
considerations, the most effective method of coercing Chinese
reform without significant detriment to the economic system
would most likely be through multilateral diplomatic channels. By
involving other world leaders and policy-makers, the Untied States
can impress upon China the global effect of its market tactics and
do so in a relatively benign setting. This method would also limit
versions of free trade bills designed to monitor China's (or any other nation's) currency
policy for signs of manipulation). This legislation should be seen as a legitimate effort to
address the perceived imbalances in international trade and not simply an attempt to
collect scalps for the next election cycle. Of course, it doesn't hurt that efforts to
promote fair trade go hand in hand with the perception of job-creation and general
economic improvement.
156 See Keenan, supra note 33.
157 See id. There is little debate over whether China artificially depreciates its
currency and whether that depreciation harms foreign companies trading on the global
market. See id.
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any retaliatory or defensive measures contemplated by the Chinese
and leave open the possibility of subsequent, more direct methods
of coercion in the future.
A. Unilateral Measures Employed by the U.S. Risk
Diplomatic Fireworks and Chinese Countermeasures
The United States has relied heavily on self-determined
remedial actions against China in the past, focusing predominately
on antidumping, countervailing duty, and intellectual property-
related investigations, among others.' Many of these actions are
predicated on U.S. rights as a WTO member nation. The United
States has also taken some actions designed to improve the
economic condition within the United States, which do not flow
from U.S. rights as a member nation in the WTO.15 9 Such
measures, though targeted at domestic problems, are not limited in
their effect to only domestic markets, as other nations feel the
consequences of U.S. policy decisions and rightfully express
displeasure when those decisions have deleterious effects. 0
1. Unilateral Actions Under the Authority of the WTO
The United States can implement administrative remedies in
the realm of international trade through its rights as a WTO
member nation."' As a condition of China's accession to the
WTO, the United States also claimed rights to discriminate against
Chinese export goods allegedly subsidized by the Chinese
158 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 21-22. "Dumping" which is the
target of antidumping investigations and remedies, is "a situation of international price
discrimination, where the price of a product when sold in the importing country is less
than the price of that product in the market of the exporting country." Technical
Information on Anti-Dumping, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/adpe/adp info e.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
"Countervailing duties" are additional duties imposed on goods entering a country,
levied due to a determination that the exporting country has unfairly subsidized the price
of those goods. See Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/scm-e/scm-e.htm (last visited Feb.
8,2011).
159 See, e.g., Hufbauer, supra note 25.
160 See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (discussing the frustrations of
emerging economies with the U.S. decision to undergo additional rounds of quantitative
easing to stimulate the domestic economy).
161 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 18-19.
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government until 2016.162 These remedies are designed mostly to
counter and eliminate undue advantages in an affected market and
not to punish the allegedly offending party.163  For this reason,
countervailing duties, antidumping duties and other safeguards
allowed under the WTO are strictly proscribed as to their length
and degree of implementation.164 Further, nations against whom
these measures have been levied have a right of recourse before
the WTO in order to have said sanctions lifted.165
The United States has been extremely active invoking its
perceived WTO rights in sanctioning Chinese trade actions,
especially product exports, to curtail some of the advantage China
has gained in that area.16 6  Imposition of remedial actions are
determined by the Department of Commerce, which follows
procedures set out in the Tariff Act of 1930 (hereinafter "Smoot-
Harley Tariff Act"). 6 ' The Act explicitly provides remedial
actions against WTO member countries deemed "Subsidy
Agreement countr[ies]" that "[are] providing . .. a countervailing
subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a
class or kind of merchandise."' 61 It also provides for
implementation of antidumping duties designed solely to mitigate
the effects of any foreign good being sold at a price below the fair
market value that has or may materially harm a U.S. industry.169
The act formally created the International Trade Commission
(hereinafter "ITC"), which was tasked with working with the
Commerce Department to make findings of whether U.S.
industries were "materially harmed" by the actions of an importing
party.'o When both the Commerce Department and ITC
determine that imports have been sold at less than the fair market
value and those sales have materially harmed a U.S. industry, the
162 See Chinese Accession Agreement, supra note 78, at 8-10.
163 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 19.
164 See id
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 20. To note, the Smoot-Harley Tariff Act is the subject of the litigation
reform designed to tighten oversight of foreign trade practices affecting U.S. industries
and discussed supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
168 Smoot-Harley Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(a)-(b) (2006).
169 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006).
170 19 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1334, 1337(b) (2006).
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administration may levy remedial duties on those offending
imports.171 A vast majority of these cases reported to and
investigated by the U.S. trade organizations have resulted in the
enforcement of remedial measures against Chinese businesses in a
wide variety of industries.'7 2
The United States has also pursued unilateral sanctions against
China, albeit rarely, implementing safeguard measures and trade
remedies regarding unforeseen, rapid rises in imports of certain
goods from China.17 These measures are instituted at the
discretion of the President as informed by a report of the USTR,
which has considerable leeway in determining how and why an
upswing in specific foreign imports have harmed the U.S.
economy.174  Considering the seemingly nebulous basis for
safeguard measures, it makes sense that there has only been one
safeguard issued by the United States since China's accession to
the WTO. '
Most unilateral actions implementing countervailing duties or
other remedies against Chinese importers have, for the most part,
gone unchallenged by the Chinese government. Perhaps secure in
its ability to continue to dominate the export markets despite such
sanctions, the Chinese government may see these measures as a
cost of doing business. Several unilateral actions by the United
States have, however, drawn the ire of the Chinese government
and, in some cases, the international community, resulting in bitter
disputes and retaliatory actions.'76
Chinese actions against the Untied States before the WTO
have been few and far between, but those actions can be
171 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 10.
172 See id. at 21-22.
173 See id
174 See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252(b)-(c) (2006).
175 See Hufbuaer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 22. That safeguard measure was
levied against multiple actors, including China, relating to the U.S. steel industry.
Another area of international trade rights that the United States zealously patrols
unilaterally is the area of intellectual property rights. Id. The authority to investigate
and sanction foreign nations for intellectual property violations emanates from the
Smoot-Harley Act. Id. The ITC is charged with investigating these claims and
recommending sanctions. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (B)-(E) (2006) (enumerating the
various intellectual property violations that are sanctionable through the ITC).
176 See Hufbuaer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 20-22.
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characterized as reactionary measures to U.S. unilateral sanctions
against China. 17 7 These U.S. measures, for the most part, were
designed to protect U.S. economic interests from allegedly
harmful global market conditions.178  Nevertheless, China
challenged these unilateral actions to protect its own rights under
the WTO agreements and has had a mixed success in doing so.
China first challenged a series of safeguard measures imposed
by the United States in 2002, which increased the import duty on
various types of steel imported from China.'7 9 China alleged the
United States did not meet certain requirements of the Agreement
on Safeguards (hereinafter "SGA") agreed to by all WTO
members, as well as alleging that the United States breached
certain articles of GATT 1994."0 Essentially, the United States
allegedly failed to meet the procedural requirements the WTO
established for implementing safeguard measures, and did not base
its safeguard determinations on "uniform, impartial, and
reasonable administration of the relevant U.S. laws and
regulations," failing to make adequate and reasonable findings to
meet the threshold for imposing safeguard measures.' After
being joined by several other nations aggrieved by the global U.S.
safeguard measures, China was vindicated by a WTO Panel.'82
The Panel found that the United States did not meet the
requirements under the SGA to impose safeguard measures and,
therefore, was in violation of its obligations under SGA and
GATT 1994." Primarily, the Panel found the United States did
not sufficiently establish the "unforeseen developments" in the
market that caused injury to U.S. domestic producers, the causal
relation between any importation and injury, or the "parallelism"
between the imported products that allegedly necessitated the
177 See id at 21-22.
178 To contrast, the U.S. actions brought against China, discussed infra Part I1.B.2,
were brought to challenge perceived attempts by the Chinese government and industries
to take advantage of the global economy.
179 See Request for Consultations by China, United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS252/1 (Apr. 2, 2002).
180 See id. at 1-2.
181 Id.
182 See Final Reports of the Panel, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures
on Imports of Certain Steel Products, XI. 11.1, WT/DS252/R (July 11, 2003).
183 See id.
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safeguard measures and those products which were in fact subject
to the safeguard measures. 8 4  An appellate body subsequently
affirmed the majority of the Panel's findings and requested the
United States to bring its safeguard measures into compliance with
its WTO obligations.'"' Though this request did not eliminate the
safeguard measures per se, a subsequent order issued by President
George W. Bush effectively repealed the measures.' 86
China next challenged determinations by the USTR that
preliminary countervailing and anti-dumping duties were required
to protect U.S. markets from Chinese produced coated free-sheet
paper."' China claimed that the Untied States made improper
findings based on unsubstantiated evidence insufficient to support
those findings that preliminary countervailing and anti-dumping
duties were needed.' There has been no action on this claim
since China's request for consultation. 89
In the summer of 2008, China filed another request for
consultations against the United States in response to anti-
dumping and countervailing duties placed on a range of Chinese
imported products, including certain types of piping, tires, and
woven sacks.190 WTO Panel findings concluded that the United
States had minimally violated its duties under GATT 1994 and the
184 See id. 11.2.
185 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, if 513-14, WT/DS252/AB/R (Oct. 23,
2003).
186 See Proclamation No. 7741, 68 Fed. Reg. 68, 483, 6 (Dec. 4, 2003).
Interestingly, and perhaps indicative of the hardball approach to such actions, the
Chinese government issued its own safeguard measures against American steel exports
during the duration of this dispute and subsequently repealed those measures once the
United States did so. See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 15.
187 See Request for Consultations by China, United States - Preliminary Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from
China, 1, WT/DS368/1 (Sep. 18, 2007).
188 See id at 1-2.
189 See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS368, United States - Preliminary Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper from
China, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/cases e/ds368_e.htm (last updated Feb. 24,
2010).
190 See Report of the Panel, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 1.1, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22,
2010).
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SCM Agreement, errors presumably corrected by more thorough
future procedural practices.191 China has notified the Dispute
Settlement Body of its appeal, claiming that the WTO Panel made
"errors of law and legal interpretation." 9 2
In 2009, China filed another request for consultations against
the United States before the WTO, alleging that U.S. regulations
effectively eliminated the ability of the United States Food and
Drug Administration to enable importation of several types of
Chinese poultry products that have been deemed fit for import.' 93
These measures by the United States were alleged to have violated
Articles I and XI of GATT 1994 and the Agriculture Agreement
signed by all WTO members or, in the alternative, the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.194 The
escalating trade disputes between the two nations over this issue
may have been a result of the spread of the HINI influenza virus,
as China joined many other WTO member nations in banning the
importation of swine and pork products from several U.S. states. 95
The Panel confirmed China's allegations, finding the
discrimination against Chinese poultry products was "maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence" and "arbitrary or
unjustifiable;" therefore, the U.S. regulation did not meet the terms
of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures and, as such, violated provisions of GATT 1994 as an
impermissible prohibition on imported products.'9 6 Though the
Panel found these violations, it did not recommend any action, as
191 See, e.g., id TT 16.16-16.18, 17.1(c) (describing the investigative errors by the
USTR).
192 See Notification of an Appeal by China under article 16.4 and Article 17 of the
Understandings on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States -
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, TT
5-10, WT/DS379/6 (Dec. 6, 2010).
193 See Request for Consultations by China, United States - Certain Measures
Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, T 5, WT/DS392/1 (Apr. 21, 2009).
194 See id 4, 6. The alternative argument was included in anticipation of the
arguments made by the United States that such measures were made for sanitary reasons.
See id. 6.
195 See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., HINI and Trade, TRADE Topics,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/agriculture/h In 1-and-trade (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
196 See Report of the Panel, United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of
Poultry from China, 8.1(b)-(c), 8.3(b), WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010).
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the United States had allowed the relevant regulation to expire.197
Later in 2009, the United States announced several tariff rates
increases on specific types of tires imported from China, raising
the tariff rate on these products beyond what China believed was
the rate allowed by international agreement.' China alleged these
actions violated Article I of GATT 1994 as similar imported tires
from other nations had not been taxed at similar rates.199 China
also alleged the United States had not made any showing that
those increased taxes fell under any acceptable exception to the
normal obligations of the United States under the WTO and other
side agreements.20 0 Following extensive briefing and arguments,
the Panel found that a market disruption by the import of Chinese
tires did exist and that the temporary tax rate increases instituted
by the United States was appropriate to mitigate the market
disruption caused by the increase in imports.2 0 ' Therefore, the
Panel tentatively found the United States had not violated its
obligations under GATT 1994 or the Protocol on the Accession of
the People's Republic of China.202 China notified the Dispute
Settlement Body of its decision to appeal this finding on May 24,
2011.'5
China's willingness to bring these remedial measures against
the United States shows the consequences of unilateral actions,
even when such actions are seemingly justified by the WTO.
Despite the relatively small sample of complaints filed against the
United States, the fact that China has been willing to challenge
those regulations it believed violated WTO agreements provides
support for the proposition that unilateral actions by the United
States alone will not be enough to influence Chinese currency
policy. Furthermore, the scale of these actions, relating to
incredibly specific, individual product markets, pales in
197 See id. 8.7-8.10.
198 See Request for Consultations by China, United States - Measures Affecting
Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/1
(Sept. 16, 2009).
199 See id
200 See id
201 See Report of the Panel, United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Certain
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, T 7.412-.415, WT/DS399/R (Dec.
13, 2010).
202 See id T 8.1.
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comparison to a challenge to China's currency exchange policy.
Any U.S. unilateral action in this area will almost certainly
provoke a response by China, both in diplomatic channels and
through the WTO.
2. Unilateral U.S. Domestic Policies Affecting the
International Community
As discussed above, the United States has taken drastic
measures to support and reinvigorate its stagnated domestic
economy in order to generate jobs, market liquidity, and generate
economic growth within the United States.203 These measures
have been received with mixed results, 2 04 but have been generally
regarded with disdain around the globe.205 As much as the Obama
administration, the Federal Reserve Bank, and Congressmen on
Capitol Hill would claim the sole goal of these measures was to
provide short-term stimulus to the domestic economy, the fact
remains that any domestic measures radically expanding
purchasing and lending power while limiting the market access of
international goods will have a significant effect on global markets
and, specifically, the price of goods elsewhere.2 06 Such trade
barriers create global trading inefficiencies, skew resource
allocation, and drive prices up; they further protectionist policies
that can deteriorate the desire for common goals amongst trading
partners; and they make negotiation and agreement on future
global issues far less likely.207
The international ire for these provisions focused primarily on
unfair subsidies by the U.S. government. As noted above, during
the height of the recent financial crisis, the U.S. Congress passed a
fiscal stimulus bill, the ARRA, which provided specific "Buy
American" requirements for many government procurement and
other projects funded by the stimulus. 208 These provisions limit
203 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., Perry Bacon Jr., In GOP Response, Jindal Blasts Stimulus, WASH.
POST, Feb. 25, 2009, at A8.
205 See, e.g., supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text (describing the uproar from
developing nations over the U.S. decision to undergo a second round of quantitative
easing).
206 See Pauwelyn, supra note 58, at 6-7.
207 See id. at 5-7.
208 See supra note 113 (discussing the ARRA bill).
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the pool of employment, materials, and other resources project
companies could utilize, providing domestic services and product
providers an advantage in these markets.2 09 Especially pertinent to
this conversation, the ARRA required "all of the iron, steel, and
manufactured goods used in [an ARRA] project [must be]
produced in the United States."2 10 These provisions, as drafted,
are worrisome with regard to U.S. international obligations and
came under heavy criticism. Even with a clause subsequently
amended to require all provisions of the bill "[to] be applied in a
manner consistent with the United States obligations under
international agreements," there was little or no substantive
direction regarding actual compliance with U.S. international
obligations.2 1'
These legislative requirements provoked the Chinese
government to impose countervailing and antidumping duties on
certain types of steel manufactured in the United States.2 12
Specifically, the Chinese government felt that steel purchased
under governmental procurement programs benefitted materially
from "Buy American" provisions. 2 13  A volley of criticisms by
U.S. steel interest groups has sparked investigations into these
duties214 as well as a formal WTO action by the U.S. government
for perceived procedural violations by the Chinese government in
implementing these duties.2 15
209 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 27.
210 Id. (quoting ARRA § 1605 (2009)).
211 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 27-28.
212 See Ministry of Commerce Notice No. 21, ALIBABA.COM (June 10, 2010),
http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/international-trade-special/100327648-1 -ministry-
commerce-notice-no.-2 I.html.
213 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United
States, WT/DS414/1 (Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Electrical Steel].
214 See Len Boselovic, US. Steel Producers Rap China on Fairness, PITTSBJRG
POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10288/1095306-28.stm.
The conflict over Chinese countervailing and anti-dumping duties on certain steel
products should not be confused with the somewhat concurrent issue of China's
allegedly massive subsidies of its domestic steel industry's growth in the clean energy
market. See Sanger & Wines, supra note 107. This dispute has metastasized in the
current economic conflict as the United States and China attempt to gain market
superiority in a fledgling industry. Id.
215 See generally Electrical Steel, supra note 213 (outlining the faults the United
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Other actions designed to stimulate short-term domestic
growth in the United States have suffered similar opprobrium from
the global community.2 16 After the Federal Reserve announced a
second round of quantitative easing, committing to purchasing
$600 billion in U.S. Treasury securities, emerging and developed
economies alike were incensed by the U.S.'s failure to consult its
trading partners in considering methods of stimulating its
211economy.217 Concerns for emerging markets stemmed from a
depreciated dollar which would allow U.S. investors to flood those
economies with money, causing inflation and other overheating
issues.218 Though economic analysts are free to debate the limited,
short-term effects of quantitative easing, it does not appear that
other countries' fears have been abated. Many of those countries
have turned to currency control measures of their own as
protection against the devaluation of both the dollar and the
renminbi.219
The risks of government involvement in stimulus appear to
extend into the global political forum. From the perspective of
other foreign nations, U.S. domestic policies have been reduced to
currency devaluation commensurate with Chinese currency policy.
Despite the disparate motivations and timelines of the two policies
in the diplomatic world, at least in this instance, perception is
reality.220 Instead of galvanizing behind U.S. efforts to pressure
China on its consistent and long-term currency policy at the latest
G-20 summit, other nations lumped U.S. quantitative easing in as
another reason the entire global currency system should be
overhauled. 221' By expanding the scope of the issues to include
multiple economic systems, G-20 leaders decreased the likelihood
States has found with China's implementation of these steel-related remedial subsidies).
216 See Bettina Wassener, Emerging-Market Countries Criticize Fed Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/business/global/05global.html.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See Sanger & Wines supra note 30 and accompanying text (identifying Japan
and Brazil as countries that have taken steps to stabilize their currencies by artificially
devaluing them on the exchange market).
220 See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussing foreign nations'
reactions to U.S. domestic policies at the G-20 negotiations in Seoul, South Korea).
221 See id.
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of reaching any rules-based, formal commitment to eliminating or
mitigating currency manipulation and other unfair price
controls.222 World leaders have recognized the need to find some
meaningful resolution to what is seen as a global problem but also
acknowledged that commitments to fairer currency policies was
far down the road.223 President Obama's obvious frustration after
the last G-20 summit tends to concede as much.2 24  The summit
was an opportunity missed; missed, in part, due to a conflicting,
perhaps ill-timed domestic policy initiative.
U.S. governmental interference in the currency market, either
direct or indirect, intentional or not, also provides a convenient
excuse for the Chinese government not to cooperate fully in any
global or bilateral currency exchange discussions, let alone any
binding commitments to reform. Leading up to and during the G-
20 Summit in South Korea, the Chinese delegation was quick to
remind other world leaders, publicly and privately, that the United
States failed to consider the global impact of its domestic
policies.2 25 Such public statements sculpt this dispute as a tete-a-
tete between the two governments, with China unwilling to
concede on its currency policy unless the United States acts in a
similar fashion. This gamesmanship is particularly troubling
because it leaves the remainder of the world caught between two
apparently immovable objects. In such a predicament,
concessions by either side are the only unilateral actions that
would ameliorate the conflict, and neither side seems keen on
giving too much away.
3. Unilateral Policies Do Not Provide Sufficient
International Support to Affect Chinese Currency
222 See Nathalie Boschat et al., G-20 to Address Hot Money, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12-
13, 2011, at Al2. This series of reform contemplates a greater role for the IMF and a
greater role of emerging economies within that resurgent IMF to deter exchange policies
that have a negative effect on the world market. See Sewell Chan, Pact to Give Markets
More Sway on Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 8. World leaders hope the newly
renovated IMF will serve as an arbiter of disputes between member nations regarding
trade and currency disputes. Id
223 Boschat, supra note 223.
224 See Chan supra note 17 and accompanying text (reporting President Obama's
comments at a news conference following the conclusion of the G-20 Summit in Seoul
regarding the continued need to press China on its currency policy).
225 See id.
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Policy
The United States should not be faulted for taking actions
either justified by its rights under the WTO to protect its domestic
market from unfair competition or seemingly required by the dire
economic climate. If the actions are as short-term as it is believed
and the economic climate improves in the coming months or
years, then the U.S. government should be applauded and forgiven
by foreign nations who were quick to accuse the United States of
protectionist policies. Those domestic policies could then be
viewed as a forgivable way of handling economic malaise but not
necessarily an appropriate or ideal way of addressing future global
crises.
However, these rationales and methods should not be applied
to the current policy dispute with China over currency
manipulation. They appear to attract too much political dissent
within the global community,2 26 which will likely perpetuate an
isolationist approach to global issues. When U.S. unilateral
actions are invariably challenged by China, little global support
exists for U.S. initiatives that were not approved or even discussed
by the international community.2 27
Additionally, unilateral actions by the United States, even
when couched within U.S. rights under the WTO, draw some level
of dissent from China itself. These disputes often extend into
multi-year settlement and appeal processes that do little to
ameliorate the relations between the two parties. Disputes
between China and the United States over certain inconsequential
market sectors (relative to the dispute here) likely pale in
comparison to an expectedly contentious dispute between the two
over China's core monetary policy. If the United States were to
impose across-the-board, unilateral sanctions on Chinese imports,
full confrontation could be expected. There is good reason why-
when diplomatic relations seemed strained leading up to and
certainly following the G-20 summit in November 2010-many
observers saw the pretext to a currency war between the United
States and China. 228 The Chinese government is adjusting to the
226 See id.
227 See id
228 See R.A., War is Hell, FREE EXCHANGE BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/1 0/Chinas-Currency.
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free market economy at a stubbornly stilted rate while the United
States, in actively seeking solutions to its unemployment and trade
deficit problems, sees China's currency and market control as
prime factors in stifling U.S. economic growth.22 9
B. Existing International Framework Lacks Enforcement
Mechanisms in this Context
As discussed above, the WTO and IMF were formed to
provide international oversight over global trade and monetary
practices while facilitating settlement of disputes between
nations.23 0  These organizations, especially the WTO, have been
instrumental in providing a dispute resolution process that is
meaningful and respected.2 3 1 The administrative measures
member nations may take in reaction to perceived threats by other
member nations can effectively protect economic interests but may
only be implemented after certain procedural elements have been
satisfied.232 The United States has been especially prolific in
soliciting the WTO for dispute resolution against China. 233  The
majority of these disputes filed by the United States against China
can be characterized as attempts by the United States to protect
"high value-added industries" where China experiences a
significant lag in technical expertise and technological skill as
compared to the United States and other developed nations.234
The WTO and IMF are ill-suited to address the current issue
because the structure of each organization and the length of
proceedings do not provide adequate remedies for such a time-
sensitive issue. Also, the WTO and IMF are unwieldy in
229 Economists worry that China's reticence to truly enter the free market system
will create a "two-speed global economy" that threatens the success of the recovery with
nations recovering on two separate tracks. See Alderman, supra note 115.
230 See supra Part II.A (discussing the development of the WTO and IMF).
231 GATT 1994 created a Dispute Settlement Body which allows aggrieved nations
to request consultation engaging allegedly wrongful nations in a settlement process. See
JAMES CAMERON & KEVIN R. GRAY, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 248, 248 (2001).
232 See Hufbauer & Woollacott, supra note 10, at 19.
233 See id. at 7.
234 Id. at 35. Such "value-added industries" may include the integrated circuit
market, where a significant amount of the manufacturing process involves implementing
technological advancements to manipulate raw materials into a final product. Id. at 8.
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addressing issues that do not fit neatly into their prescribed
jurisdictions. If harmonization of these two bodies were more
realistic, submission of this issue to an international forum would
make the most sense. These bodies would be able to "identify and
mitigate situations where their rules and procedures were not
consistent or not mutually supportive and areas where changes in
policy or institutional arrangements might be recommended to
their member countries." 235
1. U.S. Actions Against China Through the WTO
Dispute Settlement Process
A brief summary of each action the United States has taken
against China will provide a better understanding of the WTO
obligations that China has allegedly violated. These cases,
juxtaposed against the factual basis of the current conflict,
evidence the appropriate and realistic use of WTO settlement
processes. Similarly, the procedures described below will show
the time, effort, and sometimes the contrary results that arise from
WTO disputes. Though U.S. lawmakers appear ready to confront
China through the WTO regarding currency manipulation, it is
unlikely that they will either want to wait out an extended dispute
settlement proceeding or risk their political capital on a losing
case. 236
There was somewhat of a grace period between China's
accession to the WTO and the first complaint filed against it by the
United States before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.2 37
However, that grace period indicated the United States planned to
take China's promises and obligations under the WTO seriously.
In China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, the United
States instituted an action against China over its value-added tax
(hereinafter "VAT") policies purportedly implemented to favor
Chinese-designed and Chinese-produced superconductors.23 8
235 SANFORD, supra note 13, at 9.
236 There is a distinct possibility that a WTO dispute settlement board could find in
favor of China in such a dispute given the foundational law as it stands today. See infra
notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
237 China joined the WTO in 2001. See Law Office, supra note 12. The United
States filed its first complaint against China before the WTO in 2004.
238 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Value-Added Tax
on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/1 (Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Chinese
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These specific allegations fell under non-compliance with GATT
1994 Article I on General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment,
GATT 1994 Article III on National Treatment on Internal
Taxation and Regulation, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China and General Agreement on Trade in
Services (hereinafter "GATS") and Article XVII on specific
commitments to National Treatment in service provisions.23 9
Though the United States and China would settle this dispute
through constructive meetings and bilateral talks, this dispute
evidenced the growing discontent the United States had with
Chinese trade policies. 2 40
The United States next brought claims against China before
the WTO in March of 2006 alleging unfair treatment on imported
"motor vehicle parts, components, and accessories."2 41 Acting as
co-complainants with Canada and the European Union, the United
States separately claimed China had acted in contravention of its
obligations under GATT 1994 Articles III and XI, Protocol on the
Accession of the People's Republic of China, Article 2.1 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (hereinafter
"TRIMs Agreement"), 242 and Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures243
(hereinafter "SCM Agreement"). 244 After extensive fact finding
and briefing by all parties, the WTO panel held that Chinese
policies were inconsistent with its obligations under GATT 1994
Article III by affording less favorable treatment to foreign
automobile parts than similar domestic products and subjecting
Superconductors].
239 See id.
240 See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, China - Value-Added Tax on
Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/8 (Oct. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Value-Added Tax].
241 See Reports of the Panel, China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile
Parts, 1.3, WT/DS339/R (July 18, 2008) [hereinafter Panel Report on Automobiles].
242 This provision of the TRIMs Agreement prohibits member nations from
imposing TRIMs that discriminate between foreign and domestic producers. See
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX:
INVESTMENT,
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookspe/analytic index e/trims 01 e.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2011).
243 See Pauwelyn, supra note 158 and accompanying text describing countervailing
measures against unlawful subsidies.
244 See Panel Report on Automobiles, supra note 241, T 3.1-.10.
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those imported parts to taxes and fees not imposed on domestic
parts.245 Furthermore, the Panel did not find these measures fell
under GATT 1994 Article XX(d) justification that these measures
were necessary for China to comply with its WTO obligations.246
Nearly two years after the original requests for consultation, upon
an appeal by China, the WTO Appellate Body general upheld the
Panel's decisions and ordered China to bring its policies within
compliance with GATT 1994 Article III.247
In February 2007, the United States served another Request for
Consultation on China arising from alleged tax benefits to certain
Chinese domestic businesses that purchased domestic goods over
foreign imports.2 48 These actions were claimed to violate China's
obligations under GATT 1994 Article III, the SCM Agreement,
and explicit sections of Protocol on the Accession of the People's
Republic of China and Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China. 24 9 Later that year, however, the United States
and China were able to come to a mutual agreement on these
issues and settled the dispute.2 50
The United States filed another request for consultation in the
spring of 2007, claiming China had violated provisions of the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(hereinafter "TRIPS Agreement"), an annex to GATT 1994, by
not effectively protecting the intellectual property rights of U.S.
importers against copyright infringement and not properly
disposing of pirated goods seized by officials.25 1 A panel of the
245 See id. 8.4.
246 See id.
247 See Reports of the Appellate Body, China - Measures Affecting Imports of
Automobile Parts, 1 253-54, WT/DS339/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Automobile
Parts].
248 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Certain Measures
Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments,
WT/DS358/1 (Feb. 7, 2007).
249 See id.
250 See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS358, China - Certain Measures Granting
Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/cases e/ds358_e.htm (last
updated Feb. 24 2010).
251 See Report of the Panel, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, TT 1.1, 2.3-2.4, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26,
2009) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Rights].
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dispute settlement body heard voluminous arguments and found
that China's Copyright Law and administrative procedures at
Customs did not conform with the TRIPS Agreement and ordered
China to make the necessary changes to comply with its
obligations.2 52
During the same month, the United States filed another
Request for Consultation with the WTO claiming China had
violated Article III of GATT 1994 and Articles XVI and XVII of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter "GATS")
by restricting market access and impinging on other rights of
importers of "films for theatrical release, audiovisual home
entertainment products, sound recordings, and publications."253
This dispute was closely linked to the historical trend of stiff
regulation on many types of media, especially foreign media,
entering China.254 It also appeared to be an indicator as to whether
China's reforms have met the more liberal requirements for media
disbursement under the WTO. 25 5 The Panel ultimately found that
China's regulatory scheme in limiting distribution of foreign
media and books in a stricter manner than domestic media and
books was inconsistent with its WTO obligations, a decision that
was generally upheld by an Appellate Body.256
The Untied States next filed a request for consultation with the
WTO against China in March 2008, complaining of "various
measures of China [that] appear to impose market access
restrictions and discriminatory requirements on foreign service
suppliers seeking to supply financial information to customers in
China." 257  The Untied States alleged these actions violated
252 See id. IT 8.1, 8.4.
253 Report of the Panel, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 1.1, 3.1, WT/DS363/R (Aug.
12, 2009).
254 See id. IM 4.5-4.31, 4.49.
255 See id.
256 See Report of the Appellate Body, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, IM 414-17, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009).
257 Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Measures Affecting
Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers,
WT/DS373/1, 1 (Mar. 5, 2008).
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Articles XVI, XVII, and XVIII of GATS, thus affecting national
treatment and market access for foreign service providers.2 58
During bilateral consultations, China and the Untied States were
able to come to a mutual understanding of renewed Chinese
commitments to providing greater market access and protection to
foreign service providers in China.25 9  The countries agreed to
have China make necessary clarifications to existing Chinese laws
and regulations.260 Over the past two years, the Untied States has
instituted five additional actions against China that have yet to
limp through the WTO settlement process, all either remaining in
consultations or awaiting a panel decision.2 6 ' These disputes
include claims against China over several Chinese policies
designed to grow domestic service and production industries:
incentive packages to Chinese businesses to increase exports of
agricultural products, 262 restrictions on certain raw material
exports,263 market access and other service restrictions on
258 See id at 3.
259 See Joint Communication from China and the United States, China - Measures
Affecting Financial Information Servies and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers,
1-2, WT/DS373/4 (Dec. 9, 2008).
260 See Joint Communication from China and the United States, China - Measures
Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers,
3-4, WT/DS373/4 (Dec. 9, 2008).
261 See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
262 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Grants, Loans and
other Incentives, WT/DS387/lR, 1, 11 (Jan. 7, 2009).
263 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Measures Relating
to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/1, 1-2 (June 25, 2009). These
raw materials include, among others, bauxite, coke, fluorspar, silicon carbide, and zinc,
which have been subject to trade restrictions in the form of export duties and minimum
export prices. Such raw materials have been the subject of heated debates amongst
Chinese trade partners recently due to China's near complete control of the market for
several of these raw materials. See also Keith Bradsher, China Seizes Rare Earth Mine
Areas, NY TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at Bl. The export quotas China has set for these
elements have become, at times, a pawn in diplomatic disputes with trade neighbors to
gain negotiation leverage; Keith Bradsher, Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to
Japan, NY TIMES, Sep. 23, 2010, at BI (discussing a territorial dispute between China
and Japan and China's embargo on exports of rare earth minerals to Japan in an attempt
to gain leverage in negotiations); Reinhard Butikofer, When Rare Earths Get Rarer, NY
TIMES, (Sep. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/opinion/03iht-
edbutikofer.html. These materials have become vital over the past several years in the
production of smart phones, light bulbs, electric cars, and other clean energy products
and have been under increasingly strict regulations by the Chinese government.
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electronic payment services,26 and policies that place contingent
funding and other subsidies of wind power equipment
manufacturing on the use of Chinese goods over imported goods,
among others.265
Another pending action regarding countervailing and anti-
dumping duties placed on certain U.S. steel,266 mentioned above, is
of particular note and will be interesting to track through the
dispute settlement process as it appears to be a response to the
"Buy American" provisions that proliferated in stimulus
legislation and government procurement procedures in the United
States.26 7 Unlike the other actions listed above, this claim was
ultimately motivated by reactionary efforts made by China to U.S.
trade industry practices. The U.S. steel industry has also
successfully lobbied the USTR to investigate claims of
"discriminatory laws and regulations, technology transfer
requirements, restrictions on access to critical materials, and
massive subsidies" that ultimately "have given Chinese producers
an upper hand in accessing investment, technology, raw materials,
and markets [for clean energy], while foreclosing these same
opportunities to U.S. producers."268 In essence, the U.S. steel
lobby has alleged massive subsidy practices exist within the
Chinese economy. No request for consultation has been filed yet
with the WTO regarding these allegations.
2. WTO Involvement Has Temporal and Legal Barriers
Though WTO actions bring binding results, they involve a
prolonged procedure that does not necessarily acknowledge time
sensitive issues. Even after being found in violation of its WTO
264 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Certain Measures
Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/1, 2 (Sep. 20, 2010).
265 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China - Measures
Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1, 1 (Jan. 6, 2011).
266 Requests for Consultations by the United States, China - Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United
States, WT/DS414 (Sep. 20, 2010) (outlining the various obligations to the WTO that
China allegedly violated by imposing such duties on U.S. products).
267 Cf Jason Subler, China commentary blasts "Buy American" plan, REUTERS
(Feb. 14, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/15/us-china-usa-buyamerican-
idUSTRE5 1 E05420090215.
268 United Steelworkers Union, supra note 107.
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obligations, China, or any offending party, is provided with a
reasonable period of time within which it must conform its
conduct. In most cases, the hearing procedures from filing of a
request for consultations to actual implementation of Panel or
Appellate Body findings take in excess of two and a half years, if
not more. Though these procedures are usually effective in
determining a final compliance plan, there appears to be little the
complaining party can do during the intervening period within the
WTO structure to influence the offending party to act.
In a world of changing political fortunes, politicians will often
seek quick fixes that they can champion on the campaign trail as
evidence of progress. The WTO dispute resolution system is a
time investment that does nothing for politicians in the here and
now. Especially in the current economic climate when any drop in
the unemployment rate is a welcome sight, forecasts of what a
particular WTO sanction will do for the economy years down the
road is not going to be sufficiently appealing to U.S. politicians or
their constituents. Undaunted, politicians still try, as evidenced by
the amended Fair Trade Act, which would provide legal standing
by which the Untied States could unilaterally sanction China for
its currency manipulation policy.
Even if politicians actively sought WTO resolution of this
issue, the international legal foundation as currently laid cannot
provide a remedy against currency manipulation. There is no
current body imbued with authority to enjoin currency
manipulation or to authorize sanctions against a manipulating
nation. As discussed above, the majority of WTO actions are
based on violations of individual articles of the various agreements
which closely regulate specific trade actions in specific markets.
Currency manipulation is an action that is not defined by the WTO
and has yet to be interpreted by a WTO judicial body to be a
sanctionable act. As much as policymakers and economists
declare currency manipulation to be an illegal subsidy, no one
with authority has acknowledged these well-healed opinions.2 69
The IMF's problem, though not interpretative, it is
authoritative. The IMF recognizes currency manipulation as a
patently unfair monetary position, but does not have an
269 See, e.g., Lohr, supra note 8 (quoting C. Fred Bergstein as saying, "[China's
devaluation of the renminbi] is an across-the-board subsidy.").
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enforcement mechanism to remedy such actions by member
nations.270 Therefore, though an IMF declaration that China has
manipulated its currency may have weight in diplomatic
discussions, it is unlikely that the United States or any other
aggrieved country would seek IMF involvement in this dispute.
This gap in international law can be resolved in one of two
ways: amend the IMF and/or WTO agreements or solicit the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body in the hope that a panel, as formulated,
would be convinced to interpret currency manipulation as a
subsidy subject to WTO law. Neither action is a sure thing; both
present diplomatic risks that should be weighed when choosing a
path, if either. Both the WTO and IMF require more than a
supermajority to amend any agreement: The IMF Articles of
Agreement require an eighty-five percent majority while changes
to WTO agreements require near unanimity amongst members.27 '
Thus, countries currently manipulating their currencies could
easily block any proposed changes. Additionally, any proposed
changes to these agreements should be taken with their long-term
consequences in mind. Providing any international organization
with a greater degree of control necessarily limits member nations'
autonomy to act in the future. These amendments would
necessarily foreclose future measures to stabilize or bolster a
country's economic situation using the exchange system.2 72
As for relying on WTO rules as they exist today in its dispute
resolution setting, such action should be taken in consideration
with knowledge of certain deficiencies (from the perspective of a
potentially aggrieved party) that exist within the WTO dispute
system. For the Chinese government's currency manipulation to
be deemed a subsidy, an aggrieved party must show that the
Chinese government has provided direct "financial contribution"
or other indirect supporting mechanisms to a particular domestic
industry.2 3 That contribution is deemed a subsidy to the exclusive
benefit of the recipient if it cannot be achieved or determined by
the existing domestic market.27 4 The system is not based on any
270 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
271 See SANFORD, supra note 13, at 5.
272 See id.
273 SCM Agreement, art. 1, 1.1(a)(1).
274 See id. at art. 14. See also Pauwelyn, supra note 58, at 15.
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internationally agreed-upon standard, but on terms relative to the
domestic economy.2 75 It will be exceedingly difficult to prove that
currency manipulation meets these requirements. Though the
SCM Agreement does not require export subsidies (which is how
currency manipulation acts with reference to the United States) to
be determined to be industry specific, 276 it must show that the
prices achieved by China's currency policy in the export industry
cannot be achieved in the domestic market monitored by that same
currency policy.
Thus, depending on the current legal definitions and
framework of the international judicial system, the United States
would be confronted with a host of difficult legal and temporal
hurdles to overcome in seeking sanctions against Chinese currency
manipulation. Despite political pressures to act and the variety of
economic calculations that show the detrimental effect of China's
currency policy on the world economy, the fact that no actions
have been brought against China shows the delicate nature of this
issue. Seeking sanctions and remedial action against a significant
trade partner based on its entire exchange system has unparalleled
economic consequences. The threat of WTO proceedings could
spark antagonistic relations between the United States and China
which could further hinder a global economy that depends on the
production and consumption by these two powers. Such an
adverse relationship could spill over into other international issues
making it difficult for the international community to function
efficiently, if at all.
Finally, there can be no assurances that the WTO would find in
favor of the Untied States if it were to pursue this avenue of
recourse. The legal issues have been discussed above. Ultimately,
however, the decision would fall to a panel comprised of three to
five specialists agreed to by both countries to make a
determination.2 77 An adverse opinion by the WTO against U.S.
interests would only embolden other countries to manipulate the
exchange system.
275 See Pauwelyn, supra note 58, at 15.
276 See SCM Agreement, art. 2, 1 2.3.
277 See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes A Unique Contribution, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/ displ_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2011).
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C. Multilateral Negotiations Provide a Flexible Approach
and Strength in Numbers to Affect Reform in China
The academic support behind multilateral diplomacy to defuse
the conflict between the United States and China is both rational
and persuasive.2 78 Negotiations within diplomatic channels in
general should be favored over the options contemplated above
because they offer a capable forum of discussion without the threat
of sanctioning.2 79 Negotiations also allow greater flexibility in
setting the tone of interactions between nations as well as any
potential concessions or future obligations by one or both nations.
They further offer a more accessible forum for all interested
parties both in the interest of time and formality. Though some
diplomatic settings call for a certain amount of pomp and
tradition,28 0  other diplomatic situations are fly-by-night
arrangements scheduled at the convenience or necessity of the
participants.2 8 1 Multilateral diplomatic events, though conceding a
certain level of logistical flexibility, offer far more in developing
consensus on global agenda items. They also provide a forum
where consensus building can help persuade other parties to
conform to global policy initiatives. This persuasion can either
operate in a conciliatory or firm manner. The greater the
consensus, the more likely interested parties would be willing to
agree to and even commit themselves to certain actions.
This is at least the design in forecasting multilateral diplomacy
as the most effective option in coercing more rapid currency and
278 See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 35 (discussing the use of the G-20 or another
international forum to develop multilateral trade initiatives that would make it very
difficult for China to resist reform); Williamson, supra note 40 (highlighting the
effectiveness of international organizations to bring about policy changes).
279 Relative to WTO dispute settlement proceedings, regular or ad hoc diplomatic
discussions do not in and of themselves create antagonistic circumstances. However,
given a particular economic or political climate, say pre-G-20 Summit in Seoul or, better,
pre-Potsdam Conference in 1945, the circumstances surrounding a certain diplomatic
encounter can certainly affect the mood and outcome of the event.
280 For example, President Hu's recent diplomatic visit to America or any G-20-
sanctioned gathering.
281 This is not to insinuate that such brief, bilateral meetings are not carefully
orchestrated and detailed. Cf Marc Ambinder, Inside the Secret Service, THE ATLANTIC,
Mar. 2011 (providing an excellent account of the risks and immensely precise efforts
taken by security details in ensuring delegates' safety). Such meetings are not, of course,
as simple as inviting your best friend to stay over for mom's spaghetti.
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economic reform in China. There is already a legitimate structure,
the G-20, in place to coalesce a consensus among global powers
that China's currency policy must be reformed at a more rapid
rate.28 2 Leaders of G-20 nations also acknowledge that a macro-
level problem already exists regarding oversight of the currency
exchange and market control systems within member nations; 283
once these leaders move affirmatively towards firm commitments
on currency exchange reform, the onus will be on the Chinese
government to risk ostracizing itself from the global political
community for the sake of an untenable currency policy that has
begun to falter in the face of free market forces.
In modern history, there has been evidence of China's
willingness to invest in global causes, but that typically does not
occur unless there is a significant and meaningful support (and
pressure) from other nations. It will certainly take commitment
from most, if not all, major global economic actors to convince
China that progressive steps to currency reform can stabilize and
support its growing economy through transition to a more
balanced economic system.2 84  Any multilateral agreement
involving China will most likely require some sort of explicit
supervisory provisions or conttmplate ad hoc oversight by other
signatories in order to compel China to move in the right
direction.2 85
There has also been evidence of success in implementing a
diplomatic approach to solving trade disputes between the United
States and China. In 2004, the United States, along with four
other WTO members, confronted China over its VAT designed to
benefit domestic semiconductors over foreign semiconductors. 2 86
In its Request for Consultation, the United States claimed the
282 See Chan, supra note 107.
283 See id. and accompanying text.
284 See A Newly Cooperative China, supra note 32; see also Alderman, supra note
148. Calls for China to become less dependent on exports and an enormous trade deficit
became a bit more realistic when inflation crept into China's domestic markets. See
Krugman, supra note 19.
285 See Arunabha Ghosh & Ngaire Woods, Governing Climate Change: Lessons
from other Governance Regimes, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
467-71 (Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn, eds. 2009).
286 See Chinese Superconductors, supra note 238; see also Yu Min-you, supra note
71, at 134.
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Chinese government, in conflict with its WTO commitments,
provided refunds on VATs paid by domestic producers of
semiconductors as well as preferential treatment to certain
importers of semiconductors designed by domestic firms yet
manufactured overseas."' Instead of forging ahead with its initial
WTO claims, the United States worked with China through the
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (hereinafter
"JCCT")28 8 to settle the dispute. In a statement filed with the
WTO notifying that body of the settlement reached, both countries
acknowledged productive bilateral and multilateral discussions
with other complainants regarding China's VAT policy and agreed
that China's policy reforms in this area had been sufficiently
implemented. 289  Granted, these discussions came amongst the
specter of WTO involvement; it remains, however, that an
ameliorative solution was taken, agreed to, and conformed with. It
is worth noting that during President George W. Bush's
administration, the JCCT became a functional tool in resolving
potential disputes between the two nations before any adversarial
positions were taken.29 0 These examples highlight the
effectiveness of how diplomatic entreaties to China can help mold
Chinese economic policy.
Multilateral diplomatic measures have been similarly
successful in other forums in coercing Chinese commitment to
globally beneficial policies. Though China is not a signatory to
the Kyoto Protocol,2 9 ' it has ratified the agreement and has
subjected itself unilaterally to the emissions targets established in
that international agreement.292 It would be unwise to attach too
much meaning to this ratification in and of itself; however, the
Chinese government has targeted increased capacity for clean
287 See Chinese Superconductors, supra note 238, at 1.
288 The JCCT was formed specifically to engage high-level U.S. and Chinese
officials in an effort to resolve surfacing trade disputes and improve trade relations
between the two nations. See Min-you, supra note 71, at 134.
289 See Value-Added Tax, supra note 240.
290 See Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 134.
291 See, Dieter Helm, Climate-Change Policy: Why has so Little been Achieved?, in
THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (Dieter Helm & Cameron
Hepburn, eds. 2009).
292 See CHEN GANG, POLITICS OF CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROBLEMS
AND PROGRESS 108-09 (Benjamin Richardson, et al. eds., 2009).
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energy production and directed government subsidies to clean
energy industry manufacturers to implement those goals.293 The
Chinese government has also attempted to implement this national
strategy by passing reform legislation, the National Renewable
Energy Law,2 94 and organizing a Chinese National Development
and Reform Commission to drive increased investment in
renewable energy projects.29 5
The course of these negotiations and the resulting non-binding
goals set by the United States and China regarding carbon
emissions provides an indication of global commitment to secure
policy change in China. During the course of negotiating climate
change policy, there was substantial criticism of developing
nations like China for their carbon footprints.29 6 There was also
equally substantial push-back from China regarding the historic
and current carbon emissions of developed nations like the United
States. 29 7  The parallels to the current dispute over China's
currency policy should be evident at this point: China appeared
less willing to discuss currency manipulation when evidence
existed of other nations' currency manipulation, intended or not.
Essentially, each party to the dispute had a vested interest in
maintaining its position on the issue. However, the key difference
is that, within the context of climate change legislation, China
realized the pressures of a concerted global effort to address
climate change and the perception of what non-compliance would
do to its global stature. It did not hurt that there was economic
incentive to incubate a growing clean energy industry within
China. 298  Nevertheless, China's conformity with the Kyoto
Protocol goals, though not binding, was an indication of China's
ability to cooperate with the global community.
China's desire to accede and its eventual accession to the
293 See Joanna I. Lewis, China's Strategic Priorities in International Climate
Change Negotiations, 33 WASH. Q. 155, 160-61 (2007).
294 Id. at 160.
295 See Cameron Hepburn, International Carbon Finance and the Clean
Development Mechanism, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 413
(Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn, eds. 2009).
296 Editorial, See Climate Trap, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A20.
297 See id.
298 See Keith Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at Al.
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WTO was another example, in theory, of China replacing its
historically government-controlled economy in favor of a free
market economy supported by the major international economic
powers. Upon China's accession in 2001, Mike Moore, former
WTO Director-General, felt that "[w]ith China's membership, the
WTO will take a major step towards becoming a truly world
organization ... [and] acceptance of [the WTO's] rules-based
system will serve a pivotal role in underpinning global economic
cooperation." 299 Expectations for China were clearly set out in its
Accession Agreement; nevertheless, there was an understanding
that China's conformity to its economic obligations would take a
reasonable period of time. What wasn't anticipated was China's
dogged persistence in maintaining some aspects of its centrally-
planned economy to further its rapid economic growth.
After a party's accession, the WTO framework leaves little
room for further negotiation of compliance; other member nations
have the right to bring complaints against an infringing nation and
implement remedial measures if that party cannot comply with its
WTO obligations.300 That is where the distinction should be drawn
between the active diplomatic measures supported here and the
involvement of the WTO, regardless of its authority. Only ten
years have elapsed since China's accession, a period certainly not
long enough to judge the overall effect of WTO accession and the
diplomatic measures of other nations in dictating the terms of
China's accession on economic policy in China.30 '
Analyzing the issue at hand, the mere fact that China has
allowed a steady, albeit slow, appreciation of the renminbi over
the past several years is an indication that though China is not
where the United States and other developed nations would want it
to be in terms of a free market economy, China is making some
progress towards full integration into the WTO framework. There
are many self-serving reasons for China to move towards a more
flexible currency exchange policy: less dependence on U.S.
currency reserves, flexibility in transitioning its economy from
export-driven to domestic/service providing, and ultimate
299 Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 108 fn. 18 (quoting WTO Successfully Concludes
Negotiations on China's Entry, PRESS/243 (Sep. 17, 2001)).
300 See Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 133-37.
301 Id. at 116-17, 133-37.
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ascendance as a global reserve currency. There is also
understandable concern from the Chinese government, especially
during precarious economic times, to facilitate transition in a
controlled, cautious manner. It would be inaccurate, however, not
to acknowledge the influence of the G-20 and in particular U.S.
officials have had in prodding China towards accelerated currency
appreciation.3 02 The forceful diplomacy the U.S. administration
has displayed in dealing with this issue has emboldened other
nations to press China similarly on its currency issue.303 These
aggregate positions, especially when coalesced under the auspices
of the G-20, have provided sufficient pressure to move China in
the proper direction.
A more recent example of multinational diplomacy at work is
the drafting of agreed upon international factors for determining
global economic imbalances by G-20 representatives. At a
meeting in Paris, G-20 delegates of other major nations were able
to coax China into supporting the inclusion of currency exchange
rates and monetary policies in the list of factors that would
establish the basis for monitoring global economic distress and the
causes of such imbalances.30 4 The agreement was not reached
without struggles, as China initially refused to adopt any list that
included currency exchange and monetary policy as indicators of
global financial misconduct.30' This agreement is a demonstrative
shift from the fractured discussion on monetary discretion held in
Seoul in late 2010. It shows how far these parties have come in a
short period of time, perhaps prodded along by the prospect of
greater social unrest due to destabilizing forces bearing down on
working class citizens around the world.306 Though not a major
step, it is a significant, intermediate one - one that was
precipitated by firm, multilateral negotiating towards a common
302 See Arvind Subramanian, G-20 Rules; Time for Germany Bashing, BASELINE
SCENARIO, http://baselinescenario.com/2010/06/20/g-20-rules-time-for-germany-
bashing/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
303 See id.
304 See Alderman, supra note 148.
305 See id.
306 See id. The implication, here, being that nations like China that have experienced
net growth without realized benefits trickling to the working class could cause social
unrest similar to that in the Middle East and North Africa. The prime mover is clearly
inflationary driven rises in commodity prices.
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good.
The role of multilateral diplomacy cannot be understated in
manipulating Chinese domestic and foreign policies. The
circumstances and importance of such assistance are abundantly
clear:
[I]f left to its own devices, China would continue down a path
designed to exploit the global system to its sole benefit; with
helpful advice and understanding from other economic leaders,
China could develop and implement a policy that is mutually
beneficial to the development and recovery of global economies
as well.307
This quotation highlights the prevailing opinion that China has
become an integral part of the global community such that its
economic policies affect the wellbeing of other nations. It also
emphasizes the paramount importance that other nations work
with and not against the Chinese government in finding "mutually
beneficial" solutions to the unique and prescient issue that is
China's currency devaluation. Past incidents show that when
other nations work together to impress the global need for reforms,
China has been willing to come to the table and work towards an
amenable solution.
IV. Conclusion
The choice the United States faces in determining a course of
action on China's currency devaluation does not exist in a bubble.
The global economic and political landscape is ever-changing, to
the point that it is difficult to crystallize exactly what factors are in
play in making that decision. Though it is difficult, and somewhat
insensitive,30 s to characterize commodities inflation in China as a
positive development in the global system, it is one wild card that
has been dealt over the past several months that has forced China
to reevaluate its monetary policy.
307 See id.
308 Indeed, inflation has made it increasingly difficult for Chinese citizens to afford
daily necessities especially on the meager wages that the majority of Chinese citizens
live off. See China Importing U.S. Food Inflation, NATIONAL INFLATION ASSOCIATION
(Dec. 3, 2010), http://inflation.us/chinaimportingfoodinflation.html.
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Somewhat ironically, civil unrest was a factor in the Chinese
government's hesitance to liberalize its economy further:
Artificially devaluing its currency was consistent with the success
of its export-driven economy, the continued employment of its
industry workers, and its double digit annual economic growth.
Casting its lot too quickly with an economy centered on a freely
exchanged currency meant the Chinese government would risk
mass unemployment, stagnated growth, and disgruntled citizens.
All this does not mean the Chinese government did not or does not
intend on complying with its obligations as a WTO signatory,
obligations that include "[p]rice controls will not be used for
purposes of affording protection to domestic industries or service
providers."3 09 What it does mean is that China has shown it has
little impetus in implementing fair and nondiscriminatory trade
policies in the near future and other global economies will
continue to suffer the consequences of China's protectionist
economic policies.
In order to remedy these patented unfair practices, the United
States should take a diplomatic approach that incorporates other
nations' interests. Any other approach entails too much risk of (1)
disenchanting other nations through unilateral actions; (2)
providing impetus for further Chinese non-compliance; (3)
aggravating an already frayed relationship with China; (4)
escalating a trade dispute into a currency war; or (5) causing
general discord and discontent amongst global leaders. China has
shown an ability to not only act petulantly to leverage its position
in foreign affairs,3 10 but also to extend protectionist policies
imperiously. 31' An effort to reign in China's currency policy on an
acceptable timetable should avoid these threats, and multilateral
diplomacy accomplishes that.
It should be noted that efforts to rebalance China's currency is
not a silver bullet that will correct the major inequities that exist in
the global economy. Developing economies must become more
diverse and less dependent on export-driven surpluses to stimulate
growth. Likewise, developed economies should avoid deficit
309 Yu Min-you, supra note 71, at 104.
310 See, e.g., Bradsher, supra note 263 (discussing the freezing of rare earth exports
to Japan in order to influence foreign policy dispute).
311 See, e.g., Bradsher, supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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spending and feeding into the inequitable system that has
proliferated.3 12 Without such a fundamental shift in the framework
of the global economy, world leaders will simply feed into a cycle
of disparity between global economies that merely resets at the
behest of global leaders in power at a given moment.
Nevertheless, rebalancing China's currency is a sufficient step in
the right direction.313
The support the U.S. administration has garnered for
addressing China's currency manipulation has not substantially
developed because global leaders are not primarily concerned
about U.S. jobs and the U.S. economy. Recent G-20 discussions
have shown that global leaders are concerned about the
improvement of the global economy; China's currency
manipulation is merely Exhibit A in the eyes of these
representatives of a global system that is in need of greater
accountability and oversight. The more each nation, including the
United States, can do to perpetuate an atmosphere of cooperation,
the greater chance each nation can realize the benefits of a more
cohesive global economy.
This paper has outlined several avenues the United States may
take to approach the currency manipulation issue. Multilateral
diplomacy offers the most complete and far reaching benefits of
any approach, providing an opportunity to address macro issues as
opposed to micro-issues affecting solely the United States.
Though hawkish observers feel China has been able to take
advantage of the global system for long enough, steady diplomacy
will ensure nations to avoid a system of cyclical deficit/surplus
development in favor of a more balanced and prosperous global
economy.
312 See Cline & Williamson, supra note 36, at 8.
313 See Alderman, supra note 115 (emphasizing that addressing currency exchange
rates is one part of a larger problem).
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